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THE IDEA OF ADOPTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY OF 
ADULT ADOPTEE ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS 
Elizabeth J. Samuels* 
There is intense debate taking place around the country about 
whether to open birth records to adult adoptees. Our understanding 
of the legal history relevant to this debate is incomplete and inaccu-
rate. This Article provides a more accurate history of adult adoptees' 
access to birth records, and it uses that history to analyze what has 
been a complex relationship in this area of law between legal rules 
and social attitudes. The analysis traces how social attitudes and 
understandings have likely affected the construction of rules, how 
rules in turn appear to have affected attitudes, and how, finally, at-
titudes may have extended and perpetuated rules. 
In 1942 I had gone to the Probate Court ... and looked up my first 
adoption paper, and saw my mother's full name signed by her own 
hand. There was no rigmarole then; you were allowed to see your 
own paper in a kindly procedure. 1 
-Jean Paton, Adoptee. 
[E]very person has a right to know who he is and who his people 
were.2 
-Maud Morlock, U.S. Children's Bureau, 1946. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A history of adoption law has not been available that is complete 
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., University of 
Chicago School of Law, 1980; A.B., Harvard College, 1975. I would like to thank the 
University of Baltimore Educational Foundation, which provided financial support; 
the University of Baltimore Law Library for its superb services, especially those of 
Robin Klein and Harvey Morrell; students Beverly Heydon, William Thomas (Trip) 
Nesbitt, Kerryann Hamill, and Julia C. Amos for their research assistance; Annette R. 
Appell, Naomi R. Cahn, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, and Jane C. Murphy for their helpful 
comments; and my own relatives Susanna and Amanda, as well as all adoptees, birth 
parents, and adoptive parents who have shared their experiences of adoption. 
1. RUTHENA HILL KITTSON, ORPHAN VOYAGE 51-52 (1968) (author also known as 
Jean Paton). 
2. Maud Morlock, Wanted: A Square Deal for the Baby Born Out of Wedlock, 10 
CHILD 167, 168 (1946). The author was a consultant in Services for Unmarried Moth-
ers, Social Service Division, U.S. Children's Bureau. [d. at 167. 
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and accurate enough to properly inform the current debate over laws 
that seal birth records from inspection by adult adoptees. Those un-
familiar with the subject often mistakenly assume that adoption has 
always been a part of American law and that, in cases in which birth 
parents and adoptive parents are strangers, the law has always kept 
these parties' identities a secret from one another and has always 
kept adoptees from learning the identity of their birth parents. Those 
acquainted with the best informed sources understand, to the con-
trary, that adoption only became part of American law in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,3 and that adoption proce-
dures initially established by state statutes provided neither for con-
fidentiality with respect to the public nor for secrecy among the par-
ties, but were subsequently amended to protect the parties from pub-
lic scrutiny! The sources do not provide a clear picture, however, of 
the ultimate development of the regime of secrecy among the parties. 
Instead, they communicate a substantially flawed account, one that 
conflates sealing original birth records from inspection by adult 
adoptees with sealing court records from inspection by the parties 
and sealing birth records from inspection by everyone except adult 
adoptees.6 Most sources misrepresent the timing and sequence of the 
process by which all of these measures became nearly universal. This 
3. A 1920 article reviewing the history and current status of adoption laws in the 
United States noted that "adoption is now general, but it was not until the middle of 
the nineteenth century that statutes changing the common law so as to permit it were 
enacted, Massachusetts in 1851 being the first of the common law states so to legis-
late." John Francis Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332,335 (1922). 
"[B]y 1929 every state had enacted some type or"adoption legislation." DOROTHY ZIETZ, 
CHILD WELFARE: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 133 (1959). For other discussions of early 
U.S. adoption laws, see Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 
9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the 
American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971). 
4. See, e.g., 2 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 
13.01[1] (2000). 
5. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. Accounts also tend to conflate 
and confuse the subject of the sealing of court and birth records with the availability of 
information in adoption agency records. Some states passed laws sealing the case re-
cords of public agencies, or of both public and private agencies, at the same time or at 
a different time from the passage of laws concerning court or birth records, but other 
states never passed laws concerning agency records. E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MAT-
TERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 183-85 (1998). The his-
tory of the confidentiality of agency records is beyond the scope of this Article, al-
though it is mentioned below in connection with discussion of reasons for closing origi-
nal birth records to adult adoptees. That history is analyzed in a recent study by histo-
rian E. Wayne Carp, which is based on an exhaustive examination of contemporary 
materials, including not only professional journals and the files of the U.S. Children's 
Bureau and the Child Welfare League of America (a privately supported national or-
ganization), but also the annual reports and correspondence of child-placing agencies 
in different states and the 21,500 adoption case records of the Children's Home Society 
of Washington (a private agency founded in 1894). Id. at xi-xii. 
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Article provides a new and more accurate account of the sealing of 
birth records. It then uses that account to explore, in'a more nuanced 
way than formerly possible, a complex relationship in this area be-
tween law and society, between legal rules on the one hand and so-
cial attitudes and understandings on the other. This exploration en-
tails venturing into territory where certain, definite answers cannot 
be found but where speculation is both possible and fruitful. 
The widely accepted account of when adoptions in America be-
came cloaked in secrecy goes something like this. Early in the twen-
tieth century, states began moving toward protecting the privacy of 
participants in the adoption process by closing court records to public 
inspection.6 Then, in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s, virtually all 
states took the further step of imposing a unitary regime of secrecy 
under which adopting parents and birth parents who were unknown 
to one another would remain unknown and under which adult 
adoptees could never learn the identity of their birth parents. 7 While 
it is true that a small number of states closed original birth records 
to adult adoptees at approximately the same time they otherwise 
closed adoption records to the parties,8 most states proceeded much 
more slowly with respect to adult adoptees' access to birth records.9 
In fact, as late as 1960, some forty percent of the states still had laws 
on the books recognizing an unrestricted right of adult adoptees to 
inspect their original birth certificates. 1o It was only in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s that all but three of those states changed their laws 
to close birth records to adoptees. ll At the same time that those states 
6. See infra text accompanying note 26. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 26-34. 
8. For example, New York, which may have been the first or one ofthe first states 
to close original birth records to adult adoptees, as well as to other parties and the 
public, see infra text accompanying notes 46-53, sealed court records in 1935 and 
sealed original birth records in 1936. The court records law specified that "[tlhe writ-
ten report of the investigation, together with all other papers pertaining to the adop-
tion, shall be kept by the judge ... [andl must be sealed by him and withheld from in-
spection ... except upon an order of a court ... on good cause shown." 1935 N.Y. Laws 
860. The birth records law specified that when a new birth record has been made, 
"[tlhe commissioner of health shall place the original birth record and the proof, notifi-
cation and papers pertaining to the new birth record under seal. Seals shall not be 
broken except by order of a court .... " 1936 N.Y. Laws 854. A small number of states 
sealed birth records from all inspection when court records were still available. Mary-
land, in 1939, provided that original birth records be sealed, and that "the seal not ... 
be broken save by court order or by order of the Registrar for adequate reason." 1939 
Md. Laws 620; see also John S. Strahorn, Jr., Adoption in Maryland, 7 MD. L. REV. 
275,304 (1943). This was six years before Maryland sealed court records in 1945. See 
1945 Md. Laws 343. California, Colorado, and Virginia also kept court records open 
after sealing birth records. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 70-102 and accompanying text. 
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were closing birth records, a growing national advocacy movement 
for greater openness in adoption was encouraging many states to es-
tablish passive and active registries through which adult adoptees 
and birth parents could attempt to seek information about and estab-
lish contact with one another.12 
This Article relates how, in the 1940s and 1950s, a variety of ex-
. pert voices advised states to seal court and birth records but to rec-
ognize in adult adoptees an unrestricted right of access to the birth 
records. 13 The reason given for the closing of court and birth records 
to the parties as well as the public was to protect adoptive families 
from possible interference by birth parents. In contrast, no reason 
was generally offered in specific support of the closings of birth re-
cords to adult adoptees that did occur from the 1930s through the 
1960s.14 It appears that the early closings of birth records to adult 
adoptees were not the result of articulated reasons, nor merely the 
result of confusion or happenstance. The early closings may have 
been, in no small part, the consequence of a contemporary social atti-
tude or understanding, that is, of the social context in which they oc-
curred. Adoption was beginning to be perceived as a means of creat-
ing a perfect and complete substitute for a family created by natural 
childbirth. 15 Over time, as legal rules established a nearly universal 
regime of secrecy with respect to all persons' access to court records 
and all persons' except adult adoptees' access to birth records, the re-
gime of secrecy itself inevitably influenced social attitudes and un-
12. With passive registers, adoptees and birth relatives may register their interest 
in or willingness to exchange information or make contact. When a match occurs, the 
parties are put in touch with one another. With active registries, also known as 
"search and consent" systems, when one party registers, an intermediary undertakes a 
search and, if possible, makes contact with a third party or third parties on behalf of 
the registrant. More than twenty states have passive registry systems and more than 
twenty-five have active ones, many of which also allow registrants to register in ad-
vance their willingness to have contact. See 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, at app. 
13-A; Madelyn Freundlich, Open Records and Voluntary Registries, available at 
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/polrec.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001); Provi-
sions for Record Access, available at http://www.american-adoption-
cong.org/aacprov.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001) (defining terms used by different state 
adoption systems); State Adoption Disclosure Laws at a Glance, available at 
http://bastards.org/activism/access.htm (last modified Aug. 7, 2000). Efforts to estab-
lish a federal passive registry have been unsuccessful, see, e.g., Bill to Establish a Na-
tional Voluntary Mutual Reunion Registry, S. 1487, 105th Congo (1997) (passed by the 
Senate and referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means), and have proven 
controversial among open records advocates, with some supporting and others oppos-
ing measures short of completely open records, see, e.g., Survey Says: Membership of 
Two Minds on Federal Reunion Registry, GOOD CAUSE (Am. Adoption Cong., D.C.), 
Fa!l1998, at 1, 1, 8 (stating that there was no consensus among members of group). 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Part III. 
15. See infra Part IV.A. 
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derstandings. Actions once thought natural, suc:tI as attempts by 
adoptees to learn information about their birth families, came to be 
socially disfavored and considered abnormal. Such attempts acquired 
negative social meanings: they were the psychologically unhealthful 
product of unsuccessful adoptions that had failed to create perfect 
substitutes for natural families created by childbirth, and they indi-
cated adoptees' rejection of and ingratitude toward adoptive par-
ents. 16 Eventually, lifelong secrecy would be viewed as an essential 
. feature of adoptions in which birth and adoptive parents did not 
know one another. 
Radical social change beginning in the 1960s as well as the 
movement for greater openness in adoptions spearheaded by 
adoptees, and to a lesser extent by birth parents, would come to 
threaten societal acceptance of a closed and secretive adoption sys-
tem. 17 Not surprisingly, efforts to preserve and reinforce lifelong se-
crecy emerged at the same time that the adoptees' rights movement 
was leading states to move toward a somewhat greater degree of 
openness via the use of registries. IS It was during this time that adult 
adoptees' access to birth records was finally foreclosed in almost all 
states and that a new understanding about such access became wide-
spread.19 The understanding focused on a perceived right to or guar-
antee of lifelong anonymity for birth parents, particularly birth 
mothers, who had surrendered children for adoption.20 Adoptees' in-
terest in birth families came to be seen as imperiling their birth par-
ents' interests. 
Today, this new understanding in turn is being challenged as we 
are deluged with newspaper and magazine articles, television shows, 
movies, and books that spotlight or refer to adoptee and birth parent 
searches and reunions.21 Nevertheless, perhaps due in considerable 
part to the persistence of established social attitudes and under-
standings/2 only six states currently recognize the once universal 
right of adult adoptees to unrestricted information about their ori-
16. See infra notes 257-71 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra Part IV.B. 
18. See supra note 12 and infra notes 70-102 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra Part IV.B. 
20. See infra notes 356-88, 411-12 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text. In addition, a proliferation of 
websites and Internet resources facilitate, provide information about, and provide 
links to information about adoptee and birth parent searches and reunions. See, e.g., 
The ALMA Society, at http://www.almanet.com;AmericanAdoptionCongress.at 
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org; Bastard Nation, at http://www.bastard.org; 
I.S.R.R. (International Soundex Reunion Registry), at http://www.isrr.com; National 
Adoption Information Clearinghouse, at http://www.calib.com/naic. 
22. See infra Part IV.B. 
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gins. 23 Two states have recognized a qualified right to access. 24 Seven 
other states have recognized rights of access prospectively for future 
adoptees, also qualified by birth parents' rights to prohibit access, 
and a handful of states continue to permit access to, or have "re-
opened," records that were not sealed at the time they were created.25 
In Part II, this Article details the more accurate chronology of 
the laws regulating adult adoptees' access to birth records. In Part 
III, it presents a history of social and legal policies concerning such 
access. In Part IV, the Article describes and analyzes both the evolu-
tion of social attitudes about access to birth records and the relation-
23. Those states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-lOA-31(g) (2000); 2000 Ala. Acts 
794, Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (LEXIS 2000), Kansas, RAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
2423 (Supp. 1999), Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 432.420 (1999); 1999 Ore. Laws 604 (up-
held in Does v. Oregon, 993 P.2d 822 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)), South Dakota, S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 25-6-15.2 (LEXIS 1999), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 
(1991). 
24. In Delaware, birth parents wishing to block release of identifying information 
may file a written veto that must be renewed every three years. If no veto is on file 
when an adult adoptee requests the birth certificate, the state makes reasonable ef-
forts to notify birth parents. If no veto is subsequently filed, the state releases the cer-
tificate sixty-five days after the request was made. The statute took effect in January 
1999, and more than 100 birth certificates were issued during the first year. Two per-
cent of affected birth parents have filed disclosure vetoes. Frederick F. Greenman, 
TENOR: What We've Accomplished and What Lies Ahead, 16 DECREE (Am. Adoption 
Cong.), No.4, at 1, 3 (1999). In Nebraska, adopted persons twenty-one years of age and 
older have access to original birth certificates unless birth parents have signed notices 
of non consent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-146.04, .06 (Supp. 1997). 
25. They are Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-305 (Supp. 2000) (providing disclo-
sure vetoes by birth parents), Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. ANN § 578-15 (Michie 1997) 
(providing affidavit by birth parents requesting confidentiality), Maryland, MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-3A-02 (1999) (providing nondisclosure vetoes by parents), Mon-
tana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-6-109 (1999) (providing disclosure vetoes by birth par-
ents), Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(D) (West Supp. 2001) (providing 
nondisclosure affidavits by biological parents), Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
26.33.345 (West 1997) (providing nondisclosure affidavits by birth parents), Vermont, 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 6-105(b)(2) (Supp. 1999) (permitting birth parents to file re-
quests for nondisclosure). In Virginia, with respect to post-July 1, 1994, executed con-
sents in parental placement adoptions (independent, non-agency adoptions), the entire 
court record is open to adoptive parents, adoptees at age eighteen, and the birth par-
ents who executed the consents. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.54(E) (Michie 1995). 
Colorado, Ohio, Maryland, and Montana continue to permit access to, or have "re-
opened," some older records that were not sealed at the time they were created, see 
infra note 67 (records in Colorado adoptions concluded before 1967); Maryland (pre-
June 1, 1947), Md. Code Ann., Rule 9-112 (2001) (stating that court records not al-
ready sealed before June 1, 1947, may be sealed only by request of a party; however, 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 1O-616(b) (Supp 2000) states, "A custodian shall deny 
inspection of public records that relate to the adoption of an individual."); Montana 
(pre-1967), MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-109 (subject to birth parents' disclosure vetoes); 
Ohio (pre-1964), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.12(A)(2)(c) (Anderson 1999) (making 
adoption records available to the adopted person and adoptive parent). 
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ship between those attitudes and the law. 
II. CHRONOLOGY OF ADULT ADOPTEES' ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS 
The leading legal treatise on adoption law conveys the impres-
sion that while the earliest twentieth century laws shielded adoption 
proceedings only "from public scrutiny" rather than from the partici-
pants themselves, laws concerning court and birth records that were 
passed from the 1920s through the 1950s provided "for the denial to 
everyone of access to these records, except upon a judicial finding of 
'good cause."'26 The treatise outlines New York's "fairly typical" ex-
perience in which all records were sealed by the late 1930s27 and re-
ports that "[a] number of other states enacted legislation similar to 
New York's sealed records statutes at about the same time. Others 
passed similar statutes during the late 1940s or 1950s."28 The treatise 
notes that some state laws allowed original birth certificates to be in-
spected "by anyone, including adult adoptees."29 It also reports that in 
many states, "adoptees continued to have a legal right to inherit from 
members of their biological family ... with the result that confiden-
tiality at times yielded to the requirements of probate."3o 
Other writers convey the general impression that ''by the middle 
of this century, ... [a]lthough lawmakers initially enacted these se-
crecy provisions to protect the adoption triad from public exposure, 
this protection evolved to create and maintain secrecy within the 
triad: the birth family came to be entirely cut off from the adoptee 
and the adoptive family."31 In a recent historical study of adoption 
agencies' treatment of records, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclo-
sure in the History of Adoption, historian E. Wayne Carp discerned in 
the first half of the century "a consensus both in policy and practice 
of openness in disclosing information to those most intimately con-
nected to adoption."32 By the middle of the century, however, "[b]y 
26. 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1]. 
27. Id. New York's early sealing of both court and original birth records was actu-
ally highly atypical. See supra note 8. 
28. 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1]. 
29. Id. The treatise identifies four of these states and refers to "other southern 
states" in a footnote. It would be more accurate to say that many states permitted 
adult adoptees to inspect the original birth certificates, and that some of them also 
permitted adoptive parents or minor adoptees to do so. See infra notes 54-69 and ac-
companying text. 
30. 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1]; see infra notes 169-79 and 
accompanying text. 
31. Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for 
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1005 (1995) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American 
Adoption, FuTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 17, 21. 
32. CARP, supra note 5, at 100. 
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law, court proceedings of adoption and birth certificates had been 
made confidential,"33 that is, they had been permanently closed to the 
parties as well as the public. A recent sociological study of the cur-
rent debate over sealed adoption records explains simply, "[b]y the 
late 1940s, laws obliterating the adopted person's natal identity had 
become the rule rather than the exception."34 
In the mid-1920s, there were virtually no confidentiality or se-
crecy provisions in adoption law. In a 1925 report, the U.S. Chil-
dren's Bureau described and appeared to endorse what little confi-
dentiality existed for participants in the process with respect to pub-
lic access to court records. The Bureau, which was established in 
1912 within the Department of Commerce and Labor, conducted re-
search, published reports and pamphlets, and was through the 1940s 
"instrumental," according to historian Carp, "in reforming adoption 
laws, instructing professional adoption workers, and educating the 
American public on adoption issues."35 In its 1925 report, the Bureau 
spoke approvingly of two states in which court records were open 
only to the parties or by court order and of two additional states in 
which records could be closed from inspection at the discretion of the 
judge.36 With respect to contact between birth and adoptive parents, 
the report noted that while many states ordinarily required the pres-
ence in court of the birth parent or the guardian of the child to be 
adopted, "the obligatory presence of a parent who has already re-
corded his consent may not be of advantage to the child or conducive 
to the success of the new arrangement."37 
By the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, there were more state pro-
visions for confidentiality with respect to the general public's access 
to court records, but still few provisions for secrecy among the par-
ticipants. By the late 1930s, fewer than a third of the states38 ac-
corded court records any degree of confidentiality; of those that did, 
33. Id. (emphasis added). "[Tlhe intent of the law had been to exclude the public 
and protect the privacy and self-esteem of adoptive parents and adoptees." Id. 
34. KATARINA WEGAR, ADOPTION, IDENTITY, AND KINSHIP: THE DEBATE OVER 
SEALED BIRTH RECORDS 25 (1997). Professors Naomi Cahn and Jana Singer provided a 
richer and more subtle summary of the history of secrecy in adoption law, which drew 
on Professor Carp's work and located in the 1960s "the transmu[tation of] traditional 
confidentiality requirements into a regime of sealed records and secrecy which pre-
vented all members of the adoption triad from accessing information." Naomi Cahn & 
Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed 
Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 157 (1999). 
35. CARP, supra note 5, at 22-23. 
36. See EMILY FOSTER PECK, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADOPTION LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 19 (1925). 
37. Id. 
38. The term "states" in this Article and in the study discussed here includes the 
states of the United States at the time in question and the District of Columbia. 
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most permitted access to such records only to "parties in interest." 
These parties would always include adoptive parents if not adoptees 
as welp9 A 1935 summary of legislation on adoption reported a high 
volume of legislation in the preceding decade, thirty-nine states hav-
ing either "enacted new legislation or amended repeatedly their laws 
upon the subject of adoption."40 As of 1935, six states provided access 
to court records only to the parties or by court order; four states kept 
the records of decree open to the public, but permitted the court to 
withhold other court documents from inspection; and a single state 
permitted access only by court order:1 A survey of state adoption 
statutes in 1938 reported ten states in which court records were 
closed, except by court order, to all but the parties in interest; one 
state in which reports of investigations filed with the court were sub-
ject to inspection only by court order; and one state where all records 
except the decree could be withheld from inspection at the discretion 
of the judge. It was in just three states that court records could be 
opened only by court order:2 By 1943, however, it was reported that 
more than half the states had provisions protecting court records 
from public inspection, with access usually limited to "parties in in-
terest" or "parties to the action,"43 the latter, at least, generally in-
cluding only the adoptive parents or the adoptive parents and the 
adopted child.44 
Court records, of course, may contain a variety of types of infor-
mation about the parties in investigative reports as well as in plead-
ings and briefs and in testimony and other evidence, while birth cer-
tificates, although they vary from state to state and over time, in the 
1930s through the 1950s usually contained only information such as 
facts about the birth; the mother's name, maiden name, age, birth-
place, address, and earlier pregnancies; the father's name, age, 
birthplace, and occupation; whether the child was born to married 
39. "Parties of record" or "parties to the action" would include the adopting parents 
who file the adoption petition and would not include the birth parents, whose consents 
or relinquishments are required in the action if their parental rights have not been 
terminated. A state mayor may not consider the child, who is the subject of the peti-
tion, to be a party of record. See infra note 68. The concern that courts might consider 
birth parents as "parties in interest" at one time prompted federal officials to recom-
mend limiting access to "parties of record," in order to ensure that birth parents would 
not have access. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
40. Carl A. Heisterman, A Summary of Legislation on Adoption, 9 Soc. SERVo REV. 
269, 269 (1935). 
41. See id. at 289. 
42. See LEE M. BROOKS & EVELYN C. BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPfION 140-61 
(1939). In one of the ten states in which court records were closed to all but the parties 
in interest, the names of the adopters did not appear in the records. See id. at 161. 
43. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 
YALE L.J. 715, 723 n.39 (1950) [hereinafter Moppets on the Marketl. 
44. See supra note 39. 
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parents; and the name of the person or persons who attended and 
certified the birth.45 Before 1930, birth records were not amended 
when a child was adopted.46 During the 1930s states began to provide 
for new birth certificates with the adoptive parents' names substi-
tuted for the birth parents' names. In 1935, Carl Heisterman's sum-
mary of legislation reported that a number of states required their 
courts to notify state vital statistics officials of adoption decrees and 
that five of those states provided for the issuance of a new birth cer-
tificate for adopted persons. No arrangements for sealing original 
birth records were reported.47 The 1938 survey reported that six 
states simply required reports of adoptions to be made to vital statis-
tics officials while another nine states provided for new birth certifi-
cates to be issued for adoptees. Among those nine states, one state 
provided that copies of the original certificate were to be available 
only to the child when of age or to the adoptive parents,48 and one 
state allowed access only to "parties in interest."49 A 1939 book by a 
45. These items of information are included among those recommended by the fed-
eral government to the states in all or in three of the four "standard certificates" forms 
that were promulgated in 1930, 1939, 1949, and 1956. The standard certificates also 
included an address for the certifier, who might or might not be the medical attendant 
at the birth. Race of the parents was also to be recorded. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS: THE 1989 REVISION OF THE U.S. STAN-
DARD CERTIFICATES AND REPORTS 18-19 (1991). With respect to what information was 
to be provided on certified copies issued by a state, a government analyst explained in 
a 1947 article that because "the birth certificate has become an integral part of our 
everyday life," some states do and all states should provide copies with "only the facts 
a person needs for a particular purpose and nothing more," excluding facts "never in-
tended for public view. These include information about complications of pregnancy 
and delivery, the results of the mother's test for syphilis, crippling conditions of the 
infant, and illegitimacy." Helen C. Huffman, The Importance of Birth Records, 1947 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 351 [hereinafter Huffman, Importance]; see 
also Helen C. Huffman, A First Protection for the Child Born Out of Wedlock, 11 
CHILD. 34, 34 (1947) [hereinafter Huffman, First]. The author was a social science ana-
lyst in the National Division of Vital Statistics, U.S. Department of Public Health Ser-
vice. Huffman, First, supra, at 34. 
46. See MARy RUTH COLBY, DEP'T OF LABOR, PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN 
ADOPTION 120 (1941). 
47. See Heisterman, supra note 40, at 288-89. 
48. See COLBY, supra note 46, at 143. A 1961 amendment made clear that a certi-
fied copy of the original record could be issued, or inspection could be permitted, "upon 
the specific written request of the adopted person, if over eighteen years of age, or of 
an adopting parent of such person." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-53 (West 1972) (prior 
to 1975 amendment). In earlier versions of the statute, the language was unclear, sug-
gesting possibly that it was the new birth certificate, rather than the old one, that was 
available to the adult adoptee and the adopting parents. See id. 
49. COLBY, supra note 46, at 147. The survey overlooked the New York law that 
provided for the issuance of new birth certificates and the sealing of original birth re-
cords, with the original birth records to be opened only by court order. See 1936 N.Y. 
Laws 854; COLBY, supra note 46, at 120-21. The survey also did not report that Massa-
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social worker and a sociologist stated, without citation, that fifteen 
states provided for amending birth certificates.5o In a 1941 publica-
tion, the U.S. Children's Bureau agreed that "[t]he reporting of adop-
tions to the division responsible for recording vital statistics for the 
purpose of changing the birth record is a relatively new procedure."51 
It claimed, however, without citations to statutes or to secondary 
sources, that about two-thirds of the states had enacted laws making 
it possible to amend adopted children's birth records. 52 Of the seven 
states the Bureau did identify, only three were said to seal original 
birth records from public inspection, opening those records only upon 
the demand of the child, upon the demand of his natural or adopting 
parents, or by court order.53 
With respect to court records rather than birth records, contem-
porary evidence indicates that by the late 1940s and early 1950s a 
significant, if not a dramatic, shift had occurred: court records by 
that time were apparently closed in many states to all persons. For 
original birth certificates, however, as more states began to provide 
adoptees with new birth certificates, the provisions that were devel-
oping were apparently quite different, usually limiting access to the 
public but not to the adult adoptee. In a 1948 volume "digesting the 
adoption law and procedure of all states,"54 the author reported that 
most states make court records secret and available only by court or-
der and that "[iln most states, too, it is possible to obtain the issuance 
of a new birth certificate in the new name of the adopted child. Gen-
erally, the old certificate will be sealed and filed, and will be opened 
only upon request of the adopted person, if of legal age, or by an or-
der of the court."55 A federal vital statistics official, in a 1947 article, 
noted that "[n]early all states now prepare a new birth record for the 
adopted or legitimated child, and only the details of this procedl,lre 
still need to be improved." The article stressed the adoptee's "right to 
a document linking his original and adoptive identities."56 It did not 
mention that any state had foreclosed adult adoptee access to origi-
nal records, although a few states had done SO.57 In 1953, at proceed-
chusetts and Pennsylvania provided new birth certificates, contrary to information in 
the 1935 survey's tally, see Heisterman, supra note 40, at 288-89, but until 1938, Mas-
sachusetts law applied only to persons of illegitimate birth who acquired a new name 
by judicial decree. COLBY, supra note 46, at 121. 
50. See EDITH M.H. BAYLOR & ELIO D. MONACHESI, THE REHABILITATION OF CHIL· 
OREN: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CHILD PLACEMENT 31 (1939). 
51. COLBY, supra note 46, at 120. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 121. 
54. MORTON L. LEAVY, Preface to LAw OF ADOPTION SIMPLIFIED (1948). 
55. Id. at 18-19. 
56. Huffman, Importance, supra note 45, at 356-57. 
57. See id. For example, Hawaii (1945), see Bobbi W.Y. Lum, Priuacy u. Secrecy: 
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ings in which a draft of the Uniform Adoption Act was presented to 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
the committee chair expressed the view that the act's provision for 
making adoption court records available only by court order was 
commonplace and non-controversial and also that many states, as 
recommended by the act, both provided for the issuance of new birth 
certificates and permitted access by adult adoptees to original birth 
records.58 Approving these uniform law recommendations, a 1955 
Iowa Law Review article described as "the prevailing modern view" 
the provisions that court records were to be opened only by court or-
der while original birth records could be inspected by adult 
adoptees.59 
A significant shift in birth records policy had in fact occurred by 
1960, the year every state reported its statutes and procedures in Di-
gest of Statutory Provisions and Administrative Procedures for Adop-
tion as Related to Birth Certificates. 6o Of the forty-nine reporting 
states and the District of Columbia, twenty-eight reported that origi-
nal birth records were available only by court order.6! Wisconsin pro-
vided for inspection "at the discretion of the State registrar or upon 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction," and New Hampshire "at 
the discretion of the State registrar or the town clerk who has cus-
tody of the original birth record" or by court order.62 But twenty 
states, forty percent of all the jurisdictions, indicated that as of 1960, 
original birth certificates could be inspected by adult adoptees and 
otherwise by court order.63 Four of the twenty states did not specify 
The Open Adoption Records Movement and Its Impact on Hawaii, 15 U. HAw. L. REV. 
483, 489-90 (1993), Maryland (1939), and New York (1936), see supra note 8, had fore-
closed adult adoptee access to original records. 
58. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. 
59. Maurice H. Merrill & Orpha A. Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law, 
40 IOWA L. REv. 299, 328 (1955) (approving the provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act 
and the Uniform Vital Statistics Act, discussed infra at notes 118-25). 
60. NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, 
DIGEST OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADOPTION 
AS RELATED TO THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE (1960) [hereinafter ADOPTION DIGEST]. 
61. See id. Michigan's original birth records were effectively inaccessible because, 
while they were available to anyone who knew the adoptee's name at birth, they were 
not cross-referenced with the adoptee's new name. See id. 
62. Id. 
63. Those states were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. It is possi-
ble, of course, that practice may not always have been consistent with these laws, and 
there is evidence of some confusion about the law in a small number of states. See in-
fra notes 98-102, 272-84 and accompanying text. Whether a state recognizes adult 
adoptee access to court and birth records is a different matter from the practices of 
state social service agencies with respect to divulging information in their files. For 
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that the adopted person had to be an adult in order to inspect the re-
cords.64 Seven of the twenty states also permitted adoptive parents to 
inspect the records.65 Virginia, until 1977, permitted adult adoptee 
access to court records but not to birth records.66 In Colorado, court 
records were available to the parties; however, these records were 
closed to them in 1967.67 In California, complete court records were 
available to adoptive parents under a law that is still in effect but 
that at present may be inconsistently applied. 66 Similarly, of course, 
example, in Alabama at a time when the law provided for adult adoptee access to the 
birth records, the State Department of Pensions and Security, according to a report of 
a New York social worker, gave adult adoptees access "to all information about them-
selves except the names of their biological parents, which [could] be given only with 
such parents' consent." Joel Freedman, An Adoptee in Search of Identity, 22 SOC. 
WORK 227, 227 (1977). Upon request, the department would confer with the parents 
and arrange a reunion. See id. 
64. They were Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Ohio. See ADOPTION DI-
GEST, supra note 60. 
65. They were Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
and South Dakota. See id. 
66. Virginia law provided that the files of adoption cases, "none of which shall be 
exposed to public view but which shall be made available ... to persons and attorneys 
having an interest in the subject matter ... and to such other persons as the court 
shall direct in specific cases." VA. CODE ANN. § 63-359.1 (Michie 1949 & Supp. 1966). 
The law also required that "[u]pon the entry of a final order of adoption, or other final 
disposition of the matter, the clerk ... shall forthwith transmit to the Commissioner 
all reports made in connection with the case." The file with the reports "shall not be 
open to inspection, or be copied, by anyone other than the adopted child, if twenty -one 
years of age and the adoptive parents, except upon the order of a circuit court entered 
upon good cause shown." VA. CODE ANN. § 63-360 (Michie 1949 & Supp. 1966). A 1975 
law review note reported that the records the adoptee could inspect "usually do not 
identify the biological parents, although they do contain the adoptee's original name," 
citing a letter from an official of the Virginia Department of Welfare. Patricia Galla-
gher Lupack, Note, Sealed Records in Adoption: The Need for Legislative Reform, 21 
CATH. LAW. 211, 214 n.22 (1975). The law was amended in 1977 to require a court or-
der upon good cause shown for an adult adoptee to access "information with respect to 
the identity of the biological family." 1977 Va. Acts ch. 556. 
67. Colorado closed court records to public inspection in 1949. 1949 Colo. Sess. 
Laws 211. In 1967, the legislature provided that records would be "open to inspection 
only upon order of the court for good cause shown." 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 1018. In 
2000, the legislature partially re-opened pre-1967 records to the parties and provided 
that original birth certificates, orders of relinquishment, and orders of termination of 
parental rights in adoptions finalized after September 1, 1999, be open to inspection by 
adult adoptees and adoptive parents of a minor adoptee, unless birth parents within 
three years of the birth have provided the court with-and have not since withdrawn-
a statement that the parents wished the identifying information to be kept confiden-
tial. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103(6.5), 19-5-305 (West Supp. 2000). 
68. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9200(a) (West 1994). The law specifies that the "petition re-
linquishment or consent, agreement, order, report to the court from any investigating 
agency, and any power of attorney and deposition" is open only to "the parties to the 
proceeding and their attorneys and the department." Others must obtain a court order 
based on findings of "exceptional circumstances" and "good cause approaching the ne-
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in all states in independent adoptions, at least the adoptive parents' 
attorneys knew and had records that indicated the identity of birth 
parents.69 
Of the twenty states in 1960 with laws that permitted adoptees 
access on demand to original birth records, two-Alaska and Kan-
sas-have never closed these records.70 In South Dakota, both these 
records and court records appear to have always been available on 
demand, although it became necessary to make the demand to a 
court and obtain a court order.71 Of the remaining states, four 
cessitous." Id. The parties to the proceeding are the adoptive parents. Telephone In-
terview with Karen R. Lane, California Adoption Law Practitioner and Member of the 
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys (Dec. 19, 2000) (on file with author). A 1961 
California intermediate appellate court decision noted that the "files are never closed 
to the parties to the proceedings or their attorneys." Hubbard v. Superior Court, 189 
Cal. App. 2d 741, 752 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). In that case, the attorney for the minor 
adoptees had inspected the files and a third party had sought to inspect them. See id. 
at 743. The national advocacy group Bastard Nation recently reported that 
"[i]ndividual counties are given considerable freedom to interpret state adoption laws, 
with the effect that a number of counties release virtually all court controlled adoption 
records on demand of the adoptive parent and/or of the adult adoptee, with written 
permission of the adoptive parents." State Adoption Disclosure Laws at a Glance, su-
pra note 12. 
69. See generally State Adoption Law at a Glance, supra note 12. In an independ-
ent or private, non-agency adoption, the adoptive parents' attorney files the papers 
signed by the birth parent or parents giving consent or relinquishing parental rights. 
70. See ALAsKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (LEXIS 2000); Op. Alaska Att'y Gen., No. 883-
86-0110, 1986 WL 81152, at *1 (June 5, 1986) (citing the long history of availability of 
original birth certificates to adult adoptees); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423(a) (1992) 
(permitting release of original birth records to adoptees). In Kansas, court records are 
also open to "parties in interest," a term that does not include "genetic parents once a 
decree of adoption is entered." RAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2122(a) (1994). 
71. The practice in South Dakota at the present time is for adopted adults to peti-
tion a court, making a demand for access to both court and original birth records, 
which is then granted by the court, according to the Adoption Program Specialist, Di-
vision of Child Protective Services, South Dakota Department of Social Services. See 
Telephone Interview with DiAnn Kleinsasser (Oct. 18, 1999) (on file with author). Ms. 
Kleinsasser ordinarily helps approximately ten adoptees a month fill out standard pe-
tition forms, except for periods in which television programs have appeared on the sub-
ject, during which she has handled a greater volume of inquiries. See id. South Dakota 
statutes provide that court records are "not open to inspection or copy by persons other 
than the parents by adoption and their attorneys, representatives of the department of 
social services, and the child when he reaches maturity, except upon order of the 
court." S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 25-6-15 (LEXIS 1999). A 1969 attorney general opinion 
explained that under this provision, "the files and records of the court in an adoption 
proceeding[] are open to inspection or copy by the adopted child when he reaches his 
maturity, without a court order." 69 Op. S.D. Att'y Gen. 195 (1969). Birth records, on 
the other hand, "may be opened only upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or 
by the secretary of health for purposes of properly administering the vital registration 
system." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-16.4 (Michie 1994). Non-identifying information 
is available to adoptive parents or adult adoptees without court order, S.D. CODIFIED 
LAws § 25-6-15.2 (LEXIS 1999), and a public registry is available to birth parents and 
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changed these laws in the 1960s,72 six did not do so until the 1970s,73 
and seven did so only after 1979.74 It is possible, of course, and not 
inconsistent with the analysis offered below/5 that the practices of 
states' superintendents of records were not always consistent with 
state law during the period from 1960 until the law changed. In any 
event, the fact that in 1960 forty percent of the states recognized a 
right of access to original birth records is entirely consistent with the 
historical context described below.76 
In 1961, shortly after the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare compiled its digest, Illinois sealed original birth records to 
adult adoptees as well as to all others, making them "not ... subject 
to inspection or certification except upon order of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction."77 Two years later, in 1963, Ohio also closed original 
birth records to adoptees, specifying that they could be opened only 
upon a showing of good cause.7B The next year, Georgia ended adult 
adoptees' access to their original birth certificates, making the re-
cords "not ... subject to inspection except upon order of the superior 
court."79 In 1966, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office in-
terpreted New Hampshire law as giving the state registrar the "au-
thority and the duty" to direct town clerks not to cross-reference 
original and new birth certificates, making it impossible to furnish 
original records to adoptees who do not already know their original 
surnames.S{) In 1967, Arizona repealed its statutory provision allow-
ing adult adoptees to inspect their original birth records, instead al-
lowing inspection only "upon order of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion."Bl 
Six more states changed their laws in the 1970s. In 1973, Ne-
vada eliminated access by adult adoptees, allowing for opening origi-
adoptees, under which either may consent to the release to the other of the identifying 
information, see id. § 25-6-15.3. 
72. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
74. See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra Part N. 
76. See infra Part III. 
77. 1961 Ill. Laws 2943. 
78. 1963 Ohio Laws 3107.14; New Birth Certificate Law for Adopted Children Ex· 
plained by Dept. of Health, 38 OHIO B. 110, 112 (1965); Wendy L. Weiss, Note, Ohio 
House Bill 419: Increased Openness in Adoption Records Law, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
101, 133 n.33 (1997). An Ohio law passed in the 1980s ore-opened" original birth re-
cords of persons whose adoptions were decreed prior to 1964, making such records 
available on demand to adopting parents, adoptees, and lineal descendants of 
adoptees. See OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 3705.12 (Anderson 2000). 
79. 1964 Ga. Laws 88-1714. 
80. lOp. N.H. Att'y Gen. 186 (1966). 
81. 1967 Ariz. Sess. Laws 77 (repealing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-326). 
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nal birth records only upon an "order of the court issuing the adop-
tion decree, expressly so permitting, pursuant to a petition setting 
forth the reasons therefor [sic]."82 It was also in 1973 that Wyoming 
closed these records to adult adoptees, requiring for inspection an 
"order of a court of competent jurisdiction."83 In 1974, Massachusetts 
eliminated the provision in its laws under which adoptees of any age 
had a right to their original birth records, thereafter permitting re-
lease of information from the records "only upon receipt of an order of 
the probate court."B4 In 1975, Connecticut moved to abolish access by 
adult adoptees, requiring a court determination that inspection by 
the petitioning adoptive parents, adult adoptee, or other person "will 
not be detrimental to the public interest or to the welfare of the 
adopted person or to the welfare of the natural or adopting parent or 
parents."85 In 1975, North Dakota also eliminated adult access to 
original birth records, providing that "they shall not be subject to in-
spection except upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction."86 In 
1977, Louisiana ended adoptees' right to obtain upon demand a court 
order opening their birth records. The state thereafter required that 
there be "compelling reasons" and that the records be opened "only to 
the extent necessary to satisfy such compelling necessity."87 (Also in 
1977, Virginia amended its law so that adult adoptees would no 
longer have automatic access to investigative reports used in adop-
tion proceedings.)88 
The largest number of legislative actions in this final chapter of 
the story of closing birth records took place after 1979, when seven 
more states closed birth records to adult adoptees. In 1979, in Mon-
tana, illegitimately born adopted persons could no longer have their 
original birth records opened on demand, being required by an act 
passed that year to apply to a court for disclosure.89 In 1981, the law 
82. NEV. REV. STAT. 440.310 (Michie 1973). 
83. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 177. 
84. 1974 Mass. Acts 546 (codified as amended at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 
13 (Law Co-op 1993)). 
85. Sherry H. v. Probate Court, 411 A.2d 931, 934 (Conn. 1979) (citing 1975 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 75-170). Court records were also available to adoptees over twenty-one and 
adopting parents until 1974, when access was limited to the adoptive parents or to the 
adoptee older than eighteen "for cause shown, either ex parte or with such notice the 
court deems advisable." Other persons may have access "upon order of the court of 
probate rendering the decree or any other court of competent jurisdiction." 1974 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 74-164. 
86. 1975 N.D. Laws 223. 
87. Kirsch v. Parker, 383 So. 2d 384, 386 n.2 (La. 1980) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40.81(A) (West 1997), as amended by 1977 La. Acts 659); Chambers v. Parker, 
349 So. 2d 424, 425-26 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
88. See supra note 66. 
89. 38 Op. Mont. Att'y Gen. 62 (1980). 
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was amended to require that all adopted persons obtain a court or-
der.oo In the meantime, in 1980, Florida had eliminated adult adoptee 
access to original birth records, allowing "inspection only upon order 
of the court."Ol In 1981, Utah changed its law permitting adult 
adoptees access to original birth records, specifying that they "shall 
not be open to inspection except upon the order of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction."o2 Also in 1981, Wisconsin eliminated its provision 
for inspection at the discretion of the state registrar.03 In 1983, Idaho 
amended a law under which original birth records could be "revealed" 
to legitimated or adopted persons "if of age, [as well as their] parents 
or the duly appointed legal representative of any of them, or upon 
court order issued in the interest of justice."o4 The amendment re-
moved adopted persons and their parents and representatives from 
the provision so that thereafter access would be available only in 
connection with concluded paternity determinations.o5 In 1984, Penn-
sylvania effectively repealed its provision allowing adopted adults 
and adoptees' parents, guardians, or legal representatives access to 
original birth records.o6 In Alabama, before 1990, not only were origi-
nal birth records open to adult adoptees and adoptive parents, but 
court records were also available as well to the parties in interest and 
their attorneys. Alabama, in 1990, closed original birth records and 
court records at the same time that it established a system for pro-
viding non-identifying information, and identifying information un-
der certain circumstances, a system that included the appointment of 
an intermediary to contact the natural parents on the adoptee's be-
90. 1981 Mont. Laws 228 (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-304). 
91. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-296 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 36.162). 
92. 1981 Utah Laws 126 (enacting Utah Vital Statistics Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 
26-2-10 (2000». 
93. 1981 Wis. Laws 359. 
94. 1983 Idaho Sess. Laws 7. Idaho had before that date, and continues to have, 
another provision under which original birth records may be inspected only upon court 
order. That provision is evidently meant to apply only to public requests for inspection, 
and to be read in conjunction with the more specific provision that formerly permitted 
adopted adults and legitimated adults access, and that still permits the latter to have 
access. IDAHO CODE § 39-257 (Michie 1993); ADOPTION DIGEST, supra note 60. 
95. See IDAHO CODE § 39-257. 
96. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 450.603(c) (West 1993); 1984 Pa. Laws 979; 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905 (West Supp. 2000); 78 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 43 (1978) (as-
serting that the Division of Vital Statistics must make certified copies of original birth 
certificates available to competent adult adoptees). The 1984 enactment repealed the 
provisions allowing access "insofar as they are inconsistent with" a law making court 
records available only upon court order "for good cause shown," or after a court-
appointed or agency-appointed intermediary has obtained consent from the adoptees' 
birth parents, or after the death of the birth parent about whom information is sought. 
See infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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half.97 
Oklahoma has been included here among the twenty states that 
in 1960 reported laws providing adult adoptee access to original birth 
records, although the meaning of Oklahoma's law is debatable. The 
two statutory provisions the state referred to in its report to the fed-
eral government in 1960 had been passed at the same time, in 1957. 
One provided that original birth records "may be opened by the State 
Registrar only upon the demand of the adopted person, if of legal age, 
or of the adoptive parents, by an order of the court."98 The other, per-
taining to court records, provided that "[n]o person shall have access 
to such records except upon order of the judge of the court in which 
the decree of adoption was entered, for good cause shown.'>99 There is 
no Oklahoma case law concerning the birth records provision or sug-
gesting the practice of the courts over the years,100 although one legal 
97. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-32 (citing 1990 Ala. Acts 90-554); id. § 26-10-4 ; id. § 
26-10A-31 (citing 1990 Ala. Acts 90-554); id. § 26-10-5. The law stated that non-
identifying information could be provided to adoptees when they reach the age of nine-
teen or to natural parents, and identifying information could be provided to adoptees 
when they reach the age of nineteen if the natural mother or father, who may be con-
tacted by a court-appointed intermediary if necessary, has consented to the release of 
their identity, or if the court determines that the information should be released with-
out consent. [d. In 2000, Alabama joined Tennessee and Oregon in re-opening birth 
records to adult adoptees. See supra note 23. 
98. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.18(2) (current version at title 10, section 
7505.6.6 by 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws 366). The state paraphrased this section as, "the 
original birth record and any other document pertinent to the case may be inspected 
by the adopted person, if of legal age, or by the adoptive parents. In either case, a court 
order must first be obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction." Adoption Digest, 
supra note 60. 
99. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17(B) (current version at title 10, section 
7505.6.6 by 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws 366). Neither a vital statistics provision passed in 
1963 nor an attorney general's opinion issued in 1982 settled the question of whether 
the court order required by the 1963 law to inspect birth records was to be available on 
demand. The 1963 vital statistics law states that the original birth certificate "shall 
not be subject to inspection except upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction or as 
otherwise specifically provided by law," OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-316 (West 1998), 
and the attorney general's opinion simply stated that "[a]dopted persons of legal age 
demanding to view their original birth certificate must, under the provisions of 10 O.S. 
1971, § 60.18, obtain a court order." 14 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 204 (1982). The attorney 
general's opinion was based on the language of the statute, "by an order of the court," 
and the fact that this requirement was "in conformity with" the provisions of the court 
records law, which withheld court records from inspection "except upon order of the 
court for good cause shown." [d. (citations omitted). The author of the opinion, then an 
assistant attorney general and deputy chief of the civil division and now a senior assis-
tant attorney general, said in an interview that the opinion indicated the two provi-
sions were "not irreconcilable," but that the opinion did not address the question of 
whether the court had any discretion when adult adoptees make demands to the court 
for an order permitting them to inspect birth records. See Telephone Interview with 
Neal Leader (Dec. 10, 1999) (on file with author). 
100. In a 1980 district court case concerning an adoptee's access to state welfare 
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commentator in 1973 reported that a public welfare official indicated 
that state law was being interpreted as a "sealed records statute. mOl 
The birth records provision was amended in 1997 to exclude access 
upon demand. lo2 It seems likely that the legislature in 1957 intended 
to recognize a right of adoptive parents and adult adoptees to obtain 
a court order upon demand. This interpretation is supported by the 
plain language, that is, the use in the birth records provision of the 
words "upon demand"; by the difference between the language used 
in the birth and the court records provisions; and by the historical 
context described below. 
III. SOCIAL POLICIES AND ADOPTEES' ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS 
When one searches the historical record from the 1930s through 
the 1960s to understand how and why the adoption process became 
cloaked in secrecy-specifically why court records in most states 
came to be closed to all, and birth records in many states came to be 
closed even to adult adoptees-one finds through the 1950s a chorus 
of influential, authoritative voices supporting the complete closure of 
court records while recommending that original birth records remain 
available to adult adoptees. More generally, throughout the entire 
period, one finds that the reasons proffered for confidentiality and se-
crecy focus solely on protecting adoptees from embarrassing disclo-
sure of the circumstances of their births and on protecting adoptive 
parents and their adoptive children from being interfered with or 
harassed by birth parents, as it was believed they might be if birth 
parents and adoptive parents who were unknown to one another 
were to learn one another's identity. Among the legal, social service, 
and other social science commentators, there appears to be no or vir-
tually no discussion of a need to protect birth parents from adult 
adoptees seeking and acquiring information about their birth fami-
lies. 
The U.S. Children's Bureau, one of the most influential actors in 
department records, the court construed Oklahoma's welfare records law as providing 
that the department's adoption records, like court records, were only subject to disclo-
sure upon a showing of good cause. See Schechter v. Boren, 535 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. 
Okla. 1980). Comparing Oklahoma and New York closed adoption records laws, the 
district court stated that Oklahoma law provides "for the sealing of records pertaining 
to an adoption unless 'good cause' is shown," but the court did not cite or consider the 
state's birth records provision. See id. The adoptee who sought the welfare department 
records had already obtained information, including the identity of her birth mother, 
in a "'good cause' proceeding" under the state's court records provision. [d. at 4. 
101. Barbara Prager & Stanley A. Rothstein, Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His 
Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y. L.F. 137, 138 n.5 (1973) (citing a letter to Prager from the 
Director ofInstitutions, Social and Rehabilitation Services, Department of Public Wel-
fare, State of Oklahoma). 
102. 1997 Okla Sess. Laws 366. 
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the development of adoption law in the mid-twentieth century/03 
stressed in the 1940s and 1950s the desirability of shielding both 
court records and original birth records from public inspection to pro-
tect the parties from public disclosure of personal information in the 
court records and, particularly, to protect adoptees from public dis-
closure of information that might indicate their birth parents were 
not married. The' Bureau also advised that birth parents and adop-
tive parents should not have access to information about one another, 
in order to avoid the danger of the child and the adoptive parents be-
ing intruded upon by the birth parents. While urging that original 
birth records be sealed from public inspection, the Bureau specifically 
recommended that they should be available to adult adoptees. In 
1941, the Children's Bureau published a study of adoption proce-
dures in selected states in part to "furnish a basis for evaluating [ex-
isting] laws and for determining which aspects of the legislation now 
in operation could safely be recommended to other States."104 The 
study spoke approvingly of a trend toward closing the court records of 
adoption proceedings to public inspection, noting that "parties in in-
terest," who are generally permitted access to the records, might bet-
ter be termed "parties of record" to ensure that birth parents whose 
rights have been terminated would not have access.105 The suggestion 
was that "harm may be done" if "such a parent learn[s] the where-
abouts of the child after adoption."106 A Children's Bureau spokes-
woman similarly warned in a 1945 social work journal: "The child 
should ... be protected from ... interference of his natural parents 
after he has been happily established in his adoptive home."107 The 
report of a Bureau-sponsored conference in 1955 explained again the 
"desirable protection[]" that "the child not be disturbed by having two 
sets of parents," a situation that could be prevented by "placement of 
the child in such a way that the natural parents do not know where 
the child is placed."loB 
With respect to birth records, the Children's Bureau's 1941 study 
also approved of laws enacted after 1930 making it possible to amend 
the birth record of an adopted child "so that he may be spared the 
103. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
104. COLBY, supra note 46, at 1. 
105. See id. at 118-20. 
106. [d.; see also Mary Ruth Colby, Modern Safeguards in Adoption Legislation, 
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE AM. BULL., Dec. 1941, at 3, 5. 
107. Maud Morlock, Babies on the Market, SURVEY MIDMONTHLY, Mar. 1945, at 67, 
67 (emphasis omitted). She also wrote that adoptive parents "should be protected 
from ... later disturbance of their relationship to [the child] by natural parents." [d. at 
68. 
108. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PROTECTING 
CHILDREN IN ADOPTION 13 (1955) [hereinafter PROTECTING CHILDREN]. 
2001] THE IDEA OF ADOPTION 387 
embarrassment of explaining why his own name and the names of 
the parents are not the same as the names on his birth record."109 The 
study described laws under which the original certificates were 
sealed and could be opened only upon the demand of the child him-
self, or upon the demand of his natural or adoptive parents, or by or-
der of a court. The study reported the suggestion that a certificate of 
adoption might be preferable to a new certificate "since the child was 
not actually born to the adopting parents as the amended birth re-
cord implies." Mter this certificate of adoption was issued, the origi-
nal birth record "would be sealed and opened only on request of the 
child or his representative or on order of a court."IlO Whatever form 
the substitute document should take, there was no suggestion in the 
study that creating the new certificate and sealing the old one was 
for the purpose of concealing the identity of the birth parents from 
the adult adoptee. The purpose was to spare the adoptee "the embar-
rassment of having a birth certificate which gives information of the 
circumstances of his birth when only proof of age and place of birth 
are necessary."lll As a Bureau analyst concluded in 1946, "[f]or the 
protection of the adopted child[,] . " [i]t is necessary. .. that the 
original certificate and the report from the court ... be opened only 
upon court order, or upon request of the adopted person when of 
age."1l2 This position was consonant with the earlier history of Pro-
gressive Era reformers who had sought to protect mothers and chil-
dren from the stigma of the children's illegitimacy by making birth 
records confidential but who had never intended "to prevent children 
born out of wedlock, or adopted children, from viewing their own 
birth records."113 
In a 1949 publication, the Children's Bureau failed to mention 
any concern with birth parents' privacy as a reason for sealing re-
cords and specifically endorsed adult adoptee access to original birth 
certificates. With regard to the reasons otherwise supporting sealing 
original birth records, the Bureau again cited only the importance of 
shielding the adoptee from the disclosure of embarrassing informa-
tion. In one of two publications issued that year, the Bureau noted 
the importance of complete and accurate vital statistics records, fa-
cilitated by the forwarding of decrees of adoption to the state regis-
trar of vital statistics. Without this information, it was explained: 
[I]t is impossible for [the registrar] to give the adopted child the in-
formation that ties in the details on his original birth record with 
his new name and status under the adoption decree. Moreover, in 
109. COLBY, supra note 46, at 120. 
110. [d. at 121. 
111. [d. at 122. 
112. Huffman, First, supra note 45, at 36. 
113. CARP, supra note 5, at 49. 
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later life accurate and complete records will enable him to establish 
his true identity if occasion arises. 114 
In a joint publication with the American Association of Registration 
Executives' Council on Vital Records and Statistics, which recom-
mended and endorsed birth records policies, the Bureau counseled 
that amendatory birth records should be prepared after decrees of 
adoption and legitimization, but it emphasized that "[i]t is very im-
portant that the child's original birth certificate be identified so that 
his complete birth record will be available to him when needed."115 
"The right to inspect or to secure a certified copy of the original birth 
certificate of an adopted child should be restricted to the [adoptee], if 
of legal age; or upon court order."116 Again, the reasons given for seal-
ing the original records from public inspection were that "[i]n many 
cases, the original certificate will show that the child was born out of 
wedlock or that its parents are unknown. It is desirable, also, that 
the natural parents and adopting parents should remain unknown to 
each other."117 
These separate and quite different court records and birth re-
cords policies, recommended by the Bureau and by vital statistics 
professionals, were also disseminated in the 1940s and the early 
1950s in two model statutes, the Uniform Vital Statistics Act of 
1942118 and the first Uniform Adoption Act, published in 1953.119 With 
respect to court records, the Uniform Adoption Act provided that 
hearings would be held in closed courts and court records would be 
sealed:120 "All papers and records pertaining to the adoption shall be 
kept as a permanent record of the court and withheld from inspec-
tion ... except on order of the judge of the court in which the decree 
of adoption was entered for good cause shown."121 At proceedings pre-
senting the uniform act, these provisions were described by the 
chairman of the committee as ones concerning "the non-controversial 
subject of the confidential nature of the record and the proceed-
ings."122 With respect to birth records, the 1953 Uniform Adoption Act 
114. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., ESSENTIALS OF ADOPTION LAw AND 
PROCEDURE 23 (1949). 
115. CHILDREN'S BUREAU & NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, THE CONFIDENTIAL 
NATURE OF BIRTH RECORDS 6 (1949). 
116. Id. at 7. 
117. Id. 
118. UNIF. VITAL STAT. ACT (1942), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS (1942) [here-
inafter 1942 HANDBOOK]. 
119. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1953), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS (1953). 
120. Id. § 13(1). 
121. Id. § 13(2). 
122. NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITTEE 
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provided that the original birth certificate and a copy of the decree, 
which were to be sealed by the state registrar after a new certificate 
was prepared, "may be opened by the state registrar only upon the 
demand of the adopted person if of legal age or by an order of 
court.m23 The comment to this provision explained that the provision 
could be omitted in those states that have already adopted it as part 
of the Uniform Vital Statistics Act of 1942.124 At proceedings present-
ing the Act, it was noted that "[a] good many states do have it. It is 
only in the rare occasion where that is not true that this Section 
adopts that part ofthe Uniform Vital Statistics Act."125 
In 1959, the Model State Vital Statistics Act changed course 
without explanatory comment. The 1959 revision of and successor to 
the 1942 Act included an amended provision under which "the origi-
nal certificate and the evidence of adoption, paternity, or legitimation 
shall not be subject to inspection except upon order of (a court of 
competent jurisdiction).m26 Although the Children's Bureau incorpo-
rated this provision in a 1961 legislative guide, the Bureau continued 
to counsel that old and new birth records be cross-referenced so the 
registrar could "give the adopted child the information that ties in 
the details on his original birth record with his new name and status 
under the adoption decree .... [I]n later life accurate and complete 
records will enable him to establish his true identity if occasion 
arises."127 
OF THE WHOLE UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT 307 [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. 
123. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14(2) (1953). 
124. See id. § 14 cmt. (citing the UNIF. VITAL STAT. ACT, §§ 24, 35 (1942». 
125. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 309. 
126. NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, 
MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT: 1959 REVISION § 17(b)(1) (1960). The provision 
continues, as do a number of similar state provisions, "or as provided by regulation." 
[d. Such language about regulations in these statutes refers to provisions under which 
information may be released to other governmental agencies rather than to members 
of the public. The first model vital statistics act was produced in 1907 by the U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census. See James A. Weed, Vital Statistics in the United States: Preparing 
for the Next Century, 61 POPULATION INDEX 527 (1995), available at 
http://popindex.princeton.edu/current_items/Weed/Weed.html (last modified Nov. 19, 
1998). The second model act was initially drafted by the Bureau of the Census in 1939 
and then presented to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws. 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 118, at 187. The Conference and the American Bar 
Association approved a revised version in 1942. [d. at 188. In 1946, responsibility for 
vital statistics was transferred from the U.s. Census Bureau to the U.S. Public Health 
Service's National Office of Vital Statistics. Weed, supra. The Office of Vital Statistics 
produced the 1959 revision. See MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT: 1959 REVISION, 
supra. In 1960, responsibility was transferred within the Public Health Service to the 
National Center for Health Statistics, which produced revised model acts in 1977 and 
1992. Weed,supra. 
127. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE 
GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE 
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When the Uniform Adoption Act was revised in 1969, it included 
a provision similar to the 1953 Act's provision requiring the clerk of 
the court to forward information to the appropriate vital statistics of-
fice,128 but it omitted altogether the provision that required the seal-
ing of the original birth certificate while allowing it to be inspected 
upon demand by an adult adoptee. 129 In other words, the 1969 Uni-
form Adoption Act omitted altogether the subject of access to original 
birth records by adult adoptees. There was a hint in a provision of 
the 1969 Act added in 1971 that disclosure of information perhaps 
should be within the discretion of the adoptive parents or the older 
adopted child. The provision was added in response to a 1969 New 
York case, a habeas corpus proceeding brought to obtain custody of a 
child, in which the trial judge ordered the attorney for the adoptive 
parents to disclose the identity of his clients. 13o The provision stated 
that "except as authorized in writing by the adoptive parent, the 
adopted child, if 14 or more years of age, or upon order of the court 
for good cause shown in exceptional cases, no person is required to 
disclose the name or identity of either an adoptive parent or an 
adopted child."131 It was not until its 1994 revision that the Uniform 
Adoption Act included a provision for sealing original birth records 
from adult adoptees, specifically for sealing the records for ninety-
nine years and making them available during that period only by 
court order132 or upon request of adult adoptees who "furnished a con-
sent to disclosure signed by each individual who was named as a 
parent on the ... original birth certificate."133 
Another influential national organization, the private Child Wel-
fare League of America, never affirmatively recommended that origi-
nal birth records be available to adult adoptees. The League, founded 
in 1921 with sixty-five organizations as charter members, quickly be-
came "the most important private national agency for child wel-
fare."134 In 1958, it recommended both that court records "should be 
sealed and should not be open to inspection except on court order"135 
and that after a new birth certificate was issued, "[t]he original cer-
tificate should then be sealed."136 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 29-30, 57 (1961). 
128. Cf UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14 (1953) with UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 18 (1969). 
129. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 18 (1969). 
130. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 298 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
131. REVISED UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 16(3) (1969) (amended 1971). 
132. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 6-107, 9 U.L.A. 11 (1994). 
133. [d. § 6-107(a). 
134. CARP, supra note 5, at 45. 
135. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 60 (1959) 
[hereinafter 1958 STANDARDS]. 
136. [d. at 64. 
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however, the League gave as the reasons for confidentiality and se-
crecy only the need to keep adoptive and birth parents from knowing 
one another's identity and the need to protect adoptees and adoptive 
parents from the dangers of public access to personal information. 
In the League's 1941 Standards for Children's Organizations 
Providing Foster Family Care, a section on adoption included among 
"[t]he safeguards that the adopting family should expect ... [t]hat 
the identity of the adopting parents should be kept from the natural 
parents" and "[t]hat the adoption proceedings be completed without 
unnecessary publicity."137 Safeguards for the state's and the child's 
protection included "[t]hat the birth records of an adopted child be so 
revised as to shield him from unnecessary embarrassment in case of 
illegitimacy."l38 The League, in a 1959 publication, similarly coun-
seled agencies to protect adoptive parents by assuring them that 
"natural parents will not know with whom the child is placed.»l39 
With respect to the "relation of the court and adoption services," it 
advised that "[h]earings on adoption should be closed to the public. 
The identity of the natural and adoptive parents should be protected 
from each other."14o The League did not advise agencies to give birth 
parents assurances of lifelong anonymity; rather agencies were to be 
sure that birth parents had "a full awareness of the implications .... 
It should be understood that all ties are to be permanently severed 
with the [adoption] of the child.m41 
In connection with the League's 1959 recommendation that 
original birth certificates ''be sealed," the League's standards noted 
the desirability of "protect[ing] individuals from possible embarrass-
ment in revealing that they were born out of wedlock, or that one 
parent happened to be in an institution when the child was born."142 
With respect to the retention of case records, the standards stated 
that records "should preserve information about the child and his 
family which can be made available when needed.»l43 Elsewhere, the 
standards advised agencies to be prepared to offer follow-up services 
after the adoption: "In cases in which children or parents return for 
information or assistance, the agency should find out about the situa-
tion and give help with concerns related specifically to adoption, as 
137. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS 
PROVIDING FOSTER FAMILY CARE 36 (1941) [hereinafter FOSTER FAMILY CARE STAN-
DARDS]. 
138. Id. 
139. 1958 STANDARDS, supra note 135, at 31. 
140. Id. at 59-60. 
141. FOSTER FAMILY CARE STANDARDS, supra note 137, at 35. 
142. 1958 STANDARDS, supra note 135, at 64-65. 
143. Id. at 47. 
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for example a child's request to know about his natural parents.m44 
One would expect to find in secondary legal authorities from the 
1920s through the 1960s prescriptions for and critiques of changes in 
adoption law, for this was a period of rapid and frequent changes in 
the law. Between 1925 and 1935 alone, one report noted that "39 
states enacted new adoption laws or amended existing legislation to 
reflect in whole or in part the recommendations made by the Chil-
dren's Bureau.m45 Between 1940 and 1945, it was reported that "forty 
states ... improved their adoption legislation."146 A 1951 report from 
a Child Welfare League workshop reported that "since 1948 we find 
that half the states have amended their adoption laws. Seven states 
have re-enacted their adoption laws and in this brief period one state 
has done so for the second time.m47 
Among law reviews and bar journals published from the 1920s 
through the 1960s, there are numerous commentaries on adoption 
laws. A survey of most of those articles, however, revealed relatively 
little about confidentiality and secrecy in the adoption process. The 
most frequently addressed subjects are inheritance,148 independent 
adoptions,149 and ''black market" adoptions. 15o There are also general 
reviews of state laws and procedures/51 and articles on a wide smat-
tering of other topics. 152 When articles do touch on the subject of se-
144. Id. at 30. 
145. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 133. 
146. Morlock, supra note 107, at 68. 
147. Child Welfare League of Am., Adoption Practices, Procedures and Problems: A 
Report of the Second Workshop Held in New York City May 10,12,1951, at 16 (1951). 
148. See, e.g., supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text. This is by far the most 
frequently addressed topic through the 1960s. 
149. An independent placement is one in which a child is placed in the adoptive 
home by parents, friends, relatives, physicians, lawyers, or others without 
the aid of a recognized child-placing agency. An "agency placement" is one in 
which a child is relinquished by his own parent or parents to a licensed child-
placing agency with the agency assuming responsibility for the child's in-
terim care and for the selection of the child's new and permanent legal fam-
ily. 
DOROTHY ZIETZ, CHILD WELFARE: SERVICES AND PERSPECTIVES 104-05 (1969) (citing 
CAL. STATE DEP'T OF SOC. WELFARE, ADOPTING A CHILD IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1968». 
150. See, e.g., Philip B. Gilliam, The 1951 Amendments to the Relinquishment and 
Adoption Laws, 28 DICTA 227 (1951); Robert Taft, Jr., Some Problems Under The 
Adoption Laws of Ohio, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 48 (1952); Jacobus TenBroek, California's 
Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 261 (1955); Moppets on the Market, suo 
pra note 43. 
151. See, e.g., Julian Bamberger, Adoption in Indiana, 17 IND. L.J. 225 (1942); 
Eugene M. Haertle, Wisconsin Adoption Law and Procedure, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 37 
(1949); Rush H. Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri, 2 MO. L. REV. 300 
(1937); Curt Charles Silberman, Adoption in New Jersey-An Analysis of Its Legal Ef-
fects and Consequences, 1 RUTGERS L. REV. 250 (1947). 
152. See, e.g., Charles H. Miller, The Lawyer's Place in Adoptions, 21 TENN. L. REV. 
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crecy provisions, authors consistently cite the need to prevent adop-
tive and natural parents who are unknown to one another from 
learning one another's identity, in order to protect adoptive parents 
and adopted children from the possible danger of interfering or har-
assing natural parents. There appear to be no suggestions of a need 
on the part of birth parents to be protected against later discovery by 
adoptees. In a comprehensive 1950 Yale Law Journal comment on 
adoption regulation, the author discussed one danger of independ-
ently arranged versus agency-mediated adoptions: "Since the identi-
ties of natural and adoptive parents are seldom concealed from one 
another, adoptive parents are frequently harassed by a mother who 
has changed her mind and wants her child back.>H53 A comment in 
1951 on new Texas legislation explained approvingly that under new 
procedures for giving consent to adoption, it "is now possible for the 
identity of the adopted parents to be concealed from the natural par-
ents and for the identity of the natural parents to be concealed from 
the adopted parents, when the child is adopted through a licensed 
placement agency.>H54 A report about and analysis of Pennsylvania's 
1954 legislation opined in the same vein that "[i]t is agreed that it is 
best for all parties if the natural parent does not know the identity of 
the adoptive parents."155 Therefore, a statutory provision for giving 
consent outside of and before the adoption hearing has the favorable 
result that "the adoptive parents need no longer fear subsequent con-
tacts with the natural parent."156 Another commentary on the same 
legislation concurred: "A family adopting a child released under such 
circumstances has the safeguard of a guarantee that in the future the 
natural parents cannot disturb their happiness by the assertion of 
any rights in the child."157 In a 1955 Iowa Law Review symposium is-
sue on adoption, one of the authors wrote that "[ w ]hen the natural 
parents do not know where the child is placed, it seems inadvisable 
to permit them to secure that information."158 He also commented, 
"[i]t is unfortunate that sometimes [birth] parents appear to be prom-
630 (1951); Joseph W. Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11 
MINN. L. REv. 605 (1927) (judicial interpretation of adoption laws, and jurisdiction); 
Paul Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings, 
34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 649 (1959); Walter Wadlington, The Divorced Parent and Consent 
for Adoption, 36 U. eIN. L. REV. 196 (1967). 
153. Moppets on the Market, supra note 43, at 724. 
154. William H. Borchers, Recent Statute, Texas Adoption Statute-Amendments to 
Articles 46A and 46B, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 117, 119 (1951). 
155. Note, Improving the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102 U. 
PA. L. REV. 759, 770 (1954). 
156. Id. at 771. 
157. Edward Goldman, Legislation, Adoption: New Law, New Problems, 59 DICK. L. 
REV. 57, 59 (1954). 
158. Harvey Uhlenhopp, Adoption in Iowa, 40 IOWA L. REV. 228, 282 n.228 (1955). 
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ised that they may visit children when they consent to the adoption. 
This is a practice which no respectable agency would countenance."159 
On the other hand, a 1955 article on California law approved of a 
procedure in independent adoptions under which a natural parent 
may see the names of the adopters because the procedure may pre-
vent "black market evils"; but, the article noted, this procedure "em-
bodies what otherwise is regarded as a bad practice.»l60 A 1956 Los 
Angeles Bar Association report on California law expressed a some-
what contrary view, suggesting it would be sufficient if the natural 
mother knew everything she wanted to know about the adopting par-
ents except identifying information because "it is better for the child, 
better for the adopting parents, and better for the natural mother if 
she does not know the names, address and telephone number of the 
adopting parents." 161 If she insists, the report concluded, she should 
have a right to this information but the adopting parents should 
know that their identity would be disclosed.162 
A decade later, a law review comment on inheritance rights ex-
plained that anonymity was needed to "protect the adoptive parents 
from the possibility of harassment by the natural parents who may 
seek return of their child."i63 The purpose "is to effect a complete emo-
tional break between the child and the natural parents ... [and it] 
tends to lessen the fears on the part of the adoptive parent that the 
natural parents will attempt to take the child away from them."i64 
Similarly, in a 1969 review of adoption law throughout the nation, 
the chair of the American Bar Association Family Law Section's 
Committee on Adoption articulated as the rationale for secrecy in 
adoption the protection of "the adopted child and his adoptive par-
ents from possible harassment and invasions of privacy."165 The chair 
continued, suggesting just how far some states were going to protect 
against this possible harassment: "Indeed, under many statutes; 
adoptive parents are not allowed to discover the real identity of the 
child they adopted through an authorized adoption agency."166 In New 
York, a highly atypical jurisdiction with regard to how early it had 
159. Id. (citing Note, Enforcement of Pre·Adoption Promises to Allow Post·Adoption 
Visitation of Child by Natural Parents, 16 IOWA L. REV. 538, 540 (1931)). 
160. TenBroek, supra note 150, at 340. 
161. L.A. Bar Ass'n, Report and Recommendations of the Association's 1955 Special 
Committee on Adoptions, Concerning Anonymity of Adopting Parents, 31 L.A. BAR 
AsS'N BULL. 327, 327·28 (1956). 
162. Id. 
163. Paul A. Kiefer, Comment, Intestate Succession, Sociology and the Adopted 
Child, 11 VILL. L. REV. 392, 394·95 (1966). 
164. Id. at 395. 
165. Felix Infausto, Annual Review of Decisions and Statutory Revisions Affecting 
Adoptions, 3 FAM. L.Q. 123, 137 (1969). 
166. Id. 
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closed court and birth records to all,167 it was not until 1968 that the 
legislature took steps to ensure that in agency adoptions adoptive 
parents could not learn the surname of the child.16B 
One related area of adoption law that was discussed frequently 
in legal periodicals was inheritance by and through adopted chil-
dren,169 no doubt because it involves contests over property. The dis-
cussions of inheritance suggest that through the 1960s, the laws of 
many states, while providing for natural parents and adoptive par-
ents to remain unknown to one another, did not necessarily contem-
plate a total legal separation between adopted children and their 
birth relatives. Before 1935, adopted children were permitted to in-
herit from their adoptive parents, although they were generally un-
able to inherit from relatives of the adoptive parents. Adopted chil-
dren were usually permitted to inherit from their birth parents as 
well as from other birth relatives. 17o Only modest changes had oc-
curred by 1943 when a survey of the law concluded that "there is still 
a reluctance to permit the adoptee to inherit from the adoptor's rela-
tives. It is . . . possible to discern the beginning of a movement to 
deny the child's right to inherit from the natural parents .... "171 It 
was reported then that five states expressly denied adoptees the 
right to inherit from natural parents, twelve states expressly permit-
ted them to, and in the thirty-two states without statutory provi-
sions, "[t]he generally applicable rule is that the adoption should not 
be held to deprive the adoptee of the right to inherit from natural 
167. See supra notes 8, 36-59 and accompanying text. 
168. See 1968 N.Y. Laws 2951 (amending adoption relations law). 
169 ... See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 151, at 233-35; Emilio S. Binavince, Adoption 
and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative Study and a Proposal for 
Model Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 152 (1966); Limbaugh, supra note 151, at 311-12; 
Silberman, supra note 151, at 275-81; Recent Decision, Descents and Distributions-
Natural Mother of Adopted Child Preferred to Father of Adoptive Parents, 12 VA. L. 
REv. 511 (1926); Note, Inheritance by Adopted Child in Dual Capacity, 41 ILL. L. REV. 
466 (1946); Donald F. Pierce, Comment, Inheritance by, Through, and from an Adopted 
Child, 9 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1956). 
170. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 36. In addition: 
Id. 
Provisions for inheritance from the child by the adoptive parents and their 
kindred were found in thirty-two jurisdictions. The general tendency of the 
courts, in the absence of an express denial of the right of inheritance, was to 
allow the adoptive parents to inherit, limiting the property they took to that 
which the child acquired from or through them. Natural parents and kin 
were denied the right to inherit from the child in four jurisdictions. They 
were usually allowed to inherit in all others. Property received by the child, 
after his adoption, was normally excepted from inheritance by the natural 
kin. 
171. Fred L. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28 
WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 232 (1943). 
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relatives."172 
By 1956, seven states were said to be following the provision of 
the Model Probate Code of 1946, under which adopted children, for 
inheritance purposes, are treated as if they are the natural children 
of their adoptive parents and are no longer considered the children of 
their natural parents.173 However, recent legislation was also re-
ported in another seven states under which adopted children re-
tained the right to inherit from natural parents. 174 By 1970, many 
more states, but apparently still fewer than half, prohibited adopted 
children from inheriting from their natural relatives. "[T]wenty-one 
states now expressly prohibit an adopted child from inheriting the 
estate of his intestate natural parents, ten other states statutorily 
allow the inheritance and the remaining 19 states have no statute 
dealing with the question." 175 In the states without these statutes, 
"courts have almost uniformly permitted the adopted child to inherit 
from his intestate natural parents."176 Although the uniform code177 
and many commentators recommended that states treat adoptees, for 
inheritance purposes, like the natural children of their adoptive par-
ents, eliminating their right to inherit from natural relatives,178 a ma-
jority of the states had not done so by 1970.179 
In the general body of social services and other social science lit-
erature through the 1960s, the reasons given to support secrecy in 
adoption proceedings were similar both to those officially proffered by 
the Children's Bureau and the Child Welfare League of America180 
and to those expounded in the legal literature. Authors stressed the 
importance of keeping the identities of birth parents and adoptive 
parents unknown to one another.181 They also described the confiden-
tiality concern associated with original birth records as a concern 
172. Id. at 237. The author also noted that "[a]n increasing number of states accord 
intestacy rights to the adoptive parents and relatives," and that there is a "pronounced 
tendency to cut off the natural parents' right to succeed to the intestate estate of the 
adoptee." [d. at 232. 
173. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 37. 
174. Seeid.at37-38. 
175. Note, The Adopted Child's Inheritance from Intestate Natural Parents, 55 IOWA 
L. REV. 739 (1970) (footnotes omitted). 
176. [d. at 740. 
177. See supra note 173. 
178. See, e.g., Kuhlman, supra note 169, at 249; Pierce, supra note 169, at 40. 
179. See supra notes 175-76. 
180. Some authors were affiliated with or published by these influential organiza-
tions, or both. See supra notes 2, 107. The periodical Child Welfare is published by the 
Child Welfare League of America. 
181. See, e.g., Heisterman, supra note 40, at 289; Madison, Adoption: Yesterday, To-
day, and Tomorrow-Part II, 45 CHILD WELFARE 341, 344 (1966); Morlock, supra note 
107, at 67-69. 
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only that the adopted child be protected "from any stigmatizing iden-
tification on his birth certificate," and a few discussed the importance 
of adult adoptees' rights to information about their birth families. 182 
In this literature, there are many comments concerning the like-
lihood that adopted children will be curious about their birth fami-
lies, and there is nearly universal agreement that adoptive parents 
should tell children they are adopted. In contrast to an explosion of 
articles beginning in the 1970s,183 there is little discussion of desire 
on the part of adult adoptees to seek either information about or con-
tact with birth relatives, and there is apparently no discussion of any 
efforts by adoptees to do so. There is therefore no discussion of harms 
or benefits that might accrue to adoptees or their birth parents from 
such efforts. As in the legal literature, there also appears to be no 
discussion of the desirability of legislation to close original birth re-
cords to adult adoptees. This may be in part because there had not 
yet been a sizeable number of adult adoptees who had made such ef-
forts, nor a sizeable number who had encountered and protested 
closed birth records. l84 There was a huge increase in the popularity 
and number of adoptions after World War 11,185 and many states did 
not close birth records to adult adoptees until later than previously 
thought.186 Furthermore, in a social context in which adoption was in-
creasingly viewed as a perfect and complete substitute for creating a 
family by childbirth,187 it may be that in the 1950s and 1960s, many 
observers and commentators simply did not anticipate that any sig-
nificant number of adult adoptees would wish to obtain identifying 
information about their birth families. 
With respect to telling children they are adopted, there were de-
182. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 371; see also Huffman, Importance, supra note 45, at 
351,357; Morlock, supra note 107, at 67. 
183. See, e.g., HUFFMAN, Importance, supra note 45, at 356,358. She wrote in 1947 
that "[tloo frequently in the past we have neglected the child's right to a document 
linking his original and adoptive identities." Id. at 356. Further, she argued that this 
information should be available "at the request of the adopted person when of age." Id. 
at 358; see also E. Wellisch, Children Without Genealogy-A Problem of Adoption, 13 
MENTAL HEALTH 41, 41 (1952); Helen Cominas, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption 
Through Knowledge, 16 SOCIAL WORK 73, 79 (1971). 
184. See supra notes 351-59. 
185. Petitions to adopt rose from 16,000 in 1934 to 50,000 in 1944, and by the year 
1962, to 121,000, of which fifty-two percent were filed by non-relatives. See Bernice Q. 
Madison, Adoption-Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 1965 CONF. SOC. WORK 205, 
206-07. 
186. See supra Part II. A social worker and open records advocate noted in 1979, 
"[tlhe fact that sealed records are a relatively recent phenomenon is confirmed by the 
fact that adopted persons who are now in their thirties represent the first generation 
to have had their birth records sealed at adoption." Joanne W. Small, Discrimination 
Against the Adoptee, 37 PuB. WELFARE, Summer 1979, at 38,40. 
187. See infra notes 223-56 and accompanying text. 
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bates about how and at what age to tell, but most social service and 
other social science literature recommended telling, and much of it 
recommended telling at a very young age. ISS As a 1958 U.S. Chil-
dren's Bureau pamphlet for prospective adoptive parents explained, 
the child should be told, "[f]or someday, somehow, he'll learn. So you 
be the one to tell him first. He loves and trusts you. If he first learns 
from an outsider, it may seriously affect his feelings toward you. Let 
him know from the beginning.»1S9 The pamphlet went on to advise: 
"As he grows up he will want and need to know some of his own fam-
ily history. Agencies will help with this if you wish."190 During this 
period, professional literature "tended to accept as a given that the 
adoptee would never know the true facts or identity of the birth par-
ents."191 The notion of a search by an adoptee "was usually viewed as 
fantasied or symbolic rather than literal."192 A book of advice for 
adoptive parents, for example, simply reassured them not to become 
"needlessly concerned" because sometimes an adopted adolescent 
may ask where his birth parents are. All children sometimes feel that 
they are misunderstood, the authors explained, and that "somewhere 
in the world there must be the ideal parents.»193 Parents with biologi-
cal children see this "as a very unreal, passing, momentary thought," 
while adoptive parents can mistake it for reality and think that their 
child is yearning for his biological parents.194 Perspective adoptive 
parents are similarly told in another book that if they communicate 
openly with their adopted children and empathize with the situations 
of the children and their children's birth parents, then their chil-
dren's fantasies about "real" parents, although they "are bound to be 
stronger than those of the biological child, for they have grounding in 
reality ... need not be much stronger.»195 
188. See, e.g., BROOKS & BROOKS, supra note 42, at 183-87; CARP, supra note 5, at 
124-37; FOSTER FAMILY CARE STANDARDS, supra note 137, at 35 (stating that adoptive 
parents must "agree to tell the child that he is adopted"); RAEL JEAN ISAAC, ADOPTING 
A CHILD TODAY 172 (1965); FLORENCE RONDELL & RUTH MICHAELS, THE ADOPTED 
FAMILY, You AND YOUR CHILD: A GUIDE FOR ADOPTIVE PARENTS 24-27 (rev. ed. 1965); 
JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS, THE EXPERIENCE OF ADOPTED PEOPLE 2-6 
(1973); Madison, supra note 185, at 211-12. 
189. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, WHEN 
You ADOPT A CHILD 23-24 (1958). 
190. [d. at 25. 
191. Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of the Search, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 62, 65 (David M. Prodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter, eds., 
1990). The authors noted that "search ideation was generally presumed to be particu-
larly salient during the developmental phase associated with consolidating identity, 
that is, adolescence." [d. at 65-66. 
192. [d. at 65. 
193. RONDELL & MICHAELS, supra note 188, at 54-55. 
194. [d. 
195. ISAAC, supra note 188, at 188-92. Isaac relied on the work of Canadian sociolo-
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With respect to secrecy and the desires of unmarried mothers, 
there are indications in the social service and other social science lit-
erature in this period that unmarried mothers sought a measure of 
confidentiality. A careful examination of the literature, however, re-
veals the kind of protection they urgently sought and makes clear 
that it was not protection from the discovery of their identity by their 
surrendered children as adults. 196 As in the legal literature,197 there 
are statements that agency-arranged, rather than independently-
arranged, adoptions better facilitate one kind of secrecy-keeping the 
identities of adoptive parents and birth parents unknown to one an-
other. For example, in arguing for the superiority of agency to inde-
pendent adoptions, U.S. Children's Bureau consultant Maud Morlock 
explained in a social work journal: When an unmarried mother gives 
her rights to an agency, "this action protects the future security of 
the adoptive home, for the identity of the adoptive parents can be 
concealed from her."198 A book of advice for adoptive parents exhorts: 
"Only an agency can act as a blank and impenetrable wall between 
the identities of natural and adopting parents. Unfortunately, not 
even a doctor or a lawyer can guarantee this anonymity to both 
sides!"199 
In the social service literature, however, there are also many 
suggestions that agencies, as part of their efforts to promote agency-
gist and adoptive father, H. David Kirk, whose 1964 book Shared Fate criticized what 
he characterized as the prevailing "rejection-of-difference" orientation of adoptive par-
ents and argued that adoptive families are more successful when they acknowledge 
and are open to communication about their differences from biological families. See H. 
DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE 98-99 (1964). Even Kirk, however, did not discuss in that 
book whether adoptees might wish to seek identifying information about or contact 
with their birth families, although he did quote a clinical case study that contrasted 
adoptive parents who made their child feel as if the subject of adoption could not be 
discussed-parents to whom the child did not feel close-with adoptive parents who 
gave their adopted child information about her origins and who "had a free-flowing" 
kind of relationship with her. Id. at 97-98. The latter parents' child "was not in conflict 
and was not interested to know if there was more to be learned about her original par-
ents." Id. at 97 (quoting a clinical report). 
196. In historian Carp's study of the treatment of adoption agency records, he did 
not distinguish between birth mothers' desires to conceal their situations from their 
families and communities, and birth mothers' attitudes with respect to their children 
obtaining identifying information when the children become adults. He asserted that 
"it was unwed mothers themselves who had originally demanded secrecy," meaning 
secrecy that included lifelong anonymity, but he did not describe any documentary evi-
dence in support of his assertion. CARP, supra note 5, at 112. 
197. For examples of such statements in the legal literature, see L.A. Bar Ass'n, su-
pra note 161, at 327; TenBroek, supra note 150, at 320; William H. Borchers, Note, 
Texas Adoption Statute, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 117, 119 (1951); Note, Improving the Adop-
tion Process: The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102 U. PENN. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1954). 
198. Morlock, supra note 107, at 69; see also CARP, supra note 5, at 113. 
199. CARL Doss & HELEN Doss, IF You ADOPT A CHILD 72 (1957). 
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arranged adoption, should provide birth mothers with the greater 
measure of confidentiality that they often enjoyed in independent 
adoptions.20o This apparent contradiction can be resolved by under-
standing the kind of confidentiality birth mothers were seeking. They 
sought arrangements that would conceal their pregnancies from their 
parents or from other members of their communities, or from both, 
rather than arrangements that would necessarily conceal their iden-
tity from adoptive parents, or by extension, from their surrendered 
children when those children reached adulthood. Their predicament, 
explained in a 1959 account, was that when an unmarried mother 
left her home community to seek assistance from an agency else-
where, she might encounter public and private agencies that would 
not serve nonresidents, or often she might be told that it was neces-
sary to inform her home community's public welfare department. 
These practices discouraged unmarried mothers from using agency 
services, and therefore encouraged black market activities through 
which, to the detriment of children, "many couples who are rejected 
by recognized adoption agencies. . . find children available to them 
through illegal channels."201 A book on adoption for perspective adop-
tive parents similarly explained that among the reasons an unmar-
ried mother may not turn to social agencies is the fact that if she is 
financially needy, most agencies refer her to the welfare department 
where she learns she may have to start a paternity suit and "get up 
in a public court to relate her story in all its embarrassing detail."202 
An unmarried mother may also be "warned that an investigator 
might go to her parents to learn if they could contribute to her sup-
port, even though she insisted that at all costs the fact of her preg-
nancy must be kept from her family.'>203 
IV. SOCIAL CONTEXTS AND ADOPTEES' ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS 
It is difficult, in sum, to find through the 1960s expressions of 
specific reasons for closing original birth records to adult adoptees, 
either in the publications of public and private agencies or in the 
writings of legal and of social service and other social science au-
thorities, although one frequently finds advanced in such sources 
200. See infra notes 201-03. 
201. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 368. 
202. ISAAC, supra note 188, at 66. 
203. [d. Similarly, the report on a 1955 conference sponsored by the U.S. Children's 
Bureau emphasized that "[c]onfidentiality is the key to service to the unmarried 
mother. The lack of confidentiality, more than any other single factor, drives girls to 
independent plans." PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, supra note 108, at 33. The 
report explained that public agencies may be required to notify other people of the 
pregnancy, and that unmarried mothers thought both that they may have to give in-
formation about their residences and families, and that agency records may be open to 
public inspection. See id. at 11, 30-31; see also CARP, supra note 5, at 111-15. 
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specific reasons for closing court records to all persons and for closing 
original birth records to all persons except adult adoptees. Why then 
did almost all states close these birth records, albeit more slowly and 
later than has generally been believed? Some reasons can be identi-
fied by analyzing the complex ways in which law both reflects and, in 
turn, affects social attitudes and understandings, that is, the ways in 
which law reflects and affects the social context in which it exists. 
A helpful theoretical apparatus for such an analysis is provided 
in aspects of the "law and society" framework explicated by Lawrence 
Lessig in his article The Regulation of Social Meaning. 204 Professor 
Lessig describes individuals' acts-acts such as an adoptee's express-
ing interest in obtaining identifying information about or contact 
with birth relatives-as having social meanings, either a single 
meaning or a "range or distribution of meanings." 205 The social mean-
ings of acts are, of course, a function of their social context, of "the 
collection of understandings or expectations shared by some group at 
a particular time and place.''206 The more the group's understandings 
or expectations "appear natural, or necessary, or uncontested, or in-
visible, the more powerful or unavoidable or natural social meanings 
drawn from them appear to be."207 The social meanings of acts are 
both constructed by and construct the social context, and governmen-
tal actions as well as the collective action of individuals can play a 
role in the construction of social meanings.20B 
For example, as applied to this history of adoption, the early ac-
tions of state governments making access to adoption records unlaw-
ful in some circumstances may be understood as an unintentional in-
stance of one of the techniques Professor Lessig describes for affect-
ing social meanings.209 The states' acts of "tying" the stigma of illegal-
ity to the availability of identifying information under some circum-
stances may have contributed to changing the social meaning of seek-
ing identifying information under other circumstances, thus making 
searches by adult adoptees appear to be unnatural and wrong, to be 
failures of the adoption process.210 In turn, such changes in social 
meaning likely affected social attitudes and understandings, helping 
to foster an understanding that lifelong secrecy was an essential fea-
ture of adoption. Similarly, but to opposite effect, the more recent ac-
tions of individuals and groups seeking greater openness in adoption 
204. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 
(1995). 
205. [d. at 955. 
206. [d. at 958. 
207. [d. at 960-6l. 
208. See id. at 962-86. 
209. See id. at 1009-10. 
210. See infra Part N.A. 
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may be understood as efforts to use "tying" for the more difficult task 
of overcoming "the existing structures of social stigma."211 Adoptees' 
expression of interest in their origins may be de-stigmatized, that is, 
made to seem more sympathetic and natural, more right than wrong, 
both by providing mutual support to searching adoptees and birth 
relatives and by connecting their interest in their origins with com-
pelling stories about urgent searches that have resulted in successful 
outcomes. "Re-changing" the social meanings of actions in this way, 
and in turn the social attitudes and understandings of which they are 
a function, may then advance the goal of legislative change. Finally, 
the actions of those state governments that foreclosed adult adoptee 
access to birth records in the thirty years after 1960 may be under-
stood as a part of what Professor Lessig calls a "defensive construc-
tion" of social meanings, that is, an attempt to "preserv[e] an old 
meaning"212 when it is threatened. 213 
The use of this social context and meanings framework is in-
tended to shed some new light on the history of adult adoptee access 
to birth records. It is not intended to suggest that other analytical 
approaches may not be equally illuminating, such as an analysis of 
the roles played by and the power relationships among interest 
groupS.214 Adoption attorneys and adoption agency officials had finan-
cial and institutional incentives to satisfy prospective adoptive par-
ents' desires to have children who are as much "their own" as possi-
ble and, therefore, connected to other families as little as possible. 
The agencies and attorneys may also have had financial and institu-
tional incentives to conduct adoption arrangements with a minimal 
possibility of future scrutiny. In any analysis of the roles played by 
actors such as attorneys and agency officials in the passage and 
maintenance of laws, however, social attitudes and understandings 
would remain a significant factor. 
A. Through the 19608 
You have no right to any information whatsoever. You were 
adopted legally .... You had no other parents.216 
-Adoptee Florence Fisher, quoting a remark made in 1951 by 
the lawyer who had arranged her adoption. 
211. Lessig, supra note 204, at 999. 
212. Id. at 987. 
213. See infra Part IV.B. 
214. For an example of such an approach in an analysis of laws regulating trans-
racial adoptions, see Ruth Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000: 
Serving Whose Interests?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 677 (1999). 
215. FLORENCE FISHER, THE SEARCH FOR ANNA FISHER 84 (1973) (recounting an 
interview in New York City). 
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Your need to look for your mother is neurotic. You are rationalizing 
why you must know who your 'real' parents, as"'you call them, 
are. 216 
-Adoptee Betty Jean Lifton, quoting a remark made in the mid-
1950s by a psychiatrist she had consulted during her search. 
403 
The paucity of explicit reasons articulated through the 1960s for 
eliminating adult adoptee access to birth records suggests that when 
many court records were sealed and some original birth records were 
sealed even from adult adoptees, the closings of the birth records to 
adult adoptees reflected emerging attitudes and understandings, a 
social context, and not a legislative response to real or imagined 
problems associated with such access. Adoption was coming to be 
seen as a perfect or complete substitute for the creation of families 
through childbirth,217 and the sealing of records in some states even 
to adult adoptees may have been undertaken as a step consonant 
with this understanding. Over time, as most states passed laws seal-
ing records from the parties, except adult adoptees, this new legal re-
gime of partial secrecy may itself have affected the evolution of the 
social context. 
The specific rationale for closing records to the parties was to 
prevent the possibility of birth parents interfering with adoptive 
families. 218 But as most states proceeded to tie the stigma of illegality 
to the availability of adoption records to birth parents, adoptive par-
ents, and minor adoptees, the states may also have affected social at-
titudes and understandings associated with adult adoptee access to 
records. The act by an adoptee of expressing interest in his or her 
birth family began to acquire negative social meanings. As discussed 
below, adoptees interested in learning about their families of origin 
began to experience strong social constraints: those who sought such 
information were met in many quarters with disapprobation and 
were even regarded as psychologically disturbed.219 Ultimately, an 
expectation of lifelong secrecy among the parties seems to have be-
come firmly established, an expectation that both reflected and fos-
tered the negative social meanings associated with adoptees seeking 
information.220 Lifelong secrecy apparently came to "appear natural, 
or necessary, or uncontested,"221 so natural, necessary, or uncontested 
that eventually the distinction between sealing court records from all 
216. BE'ITY JEAN LIFTON, TWICE BORN: MEMOIRS OF AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER 108 
(1977) (recounting a consultation with a psychiatrist in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
when she was searching for her birth mother). 
217. See infra notes 223-56 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra Part III. 
219. See infra notes 258-69 and accompanying text. 
220. See infra notes 271-84 and accompanying text; Part N.B. 
221. Lessig, supra note 204, at 960-61. 
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inspection and sealing birth records from inspection even by adult 
adoptees became lost. Recent history forgotten, "closed records" came 
to be written and thought about in a unitary sense.222 
The social understanding that was probably reflected in the ear-
liest closings of birth records to adult adoptees was that adoption was 
a perfect and complete substitute for the creation of families through 
childbirth. The new birth certificate issued after adoption substituted 
the adoptive parents' names for the birth parents' names, "show-
ing ... the adoptive parents as the real parents," as one law review 
article explained.223 The law could confer on children in need offami-
lies new identities that would obliterate forever their original identi-
ties, and the law could provide adoptive parents with children who, 
like children born to them, would have no connection to any other 
family. This idea of adoption was facilitated by a partial swing of the 
pendulum away from nature and closer to nurture as the basis of 
human development.224 The idea also was in keeping in the immedi-
ate post-World War II years with both a pro-family, pro-natal ideol-
ogy,225 and a complementary notion that young, white unmarried 
mothers, by giving up their babies for adoption, could overcome the 
psychological problems that had led to their predicaments and make 
fresh starts in their lives.226 
The understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substi-
tute for creating a family through birth was discernable in the prac-
tices of many adoption agencies, practices that embodied "the myth 
that once the adoption was legalized ... the child would be the same 
'as if born' to the adopting parents."227 In the mid-1950s, many agen-
cies tried "to match physical characteristics of adoptee and adopters 
as well as the presumed intellectual capacity, educational back-
ground, and socioeconomic status of the potential adoptive couple 
and the birth parents. Religion matching was also common as were 
age restrictions for the applicant couple.»228 In the eyes of a contem-
porary critic, sociologist, and adoptive parent H. David Kirk, these 
222. See infra notes 271-84, 359-74. 
223. Haertle, supra note 151, at 43. 
224. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text. 
225. See infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text. 
226. See infra notes 245-56 and accompanying text. 
227. Janette Thompson, Roots and Rights-A Challenge for Adoption, Soc. WORKER 
13, 13 (1979) (reporting a study by the Children's Aid Society of Metro Toronto, Can-
ada). The author notes that adoptive parents were encouraged to tell children of their 
adoption, but then were offered little help. Adopting parents received "euphemisti-
cally" presented birth history "to ensure the complete acceptance of the child's past by 
the adopters in the hope that this would permit a lasting bond to develop. A worth-
while hope-but one which ignored the fact that the history actually belonged to the 
child." [d. 
228. Sokoloff, supra note 31, at 23. 
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and other practices, although not necessarily undesirable in them-
selves, reinforced what he considered to be an unhealthy but pre-
dominant "rejection-of-difference" orientation of adoptive parents. 
Additional agency practices he identified as encouraging this type of 
orientation were: not providing services after legalization of the 
adoption, revealing limited information about children's background, 
placing children at a geographical distance from their birth parents, 
and keeping records confidential. Influenced by this rejection-of-
difference orientation, adoptive parents, even when telling children 
of their adoption, were hesitant to acknowledge that there might be 
any significant differences between adoptive and biological fami-
lies.229 To another, later observer, the agency practice in the 1950s of 
placing infants at a younger age than formerly, while it "grew up in 
response to theory about what was best for the children, ... rein-
forced the adoptive parents' denial that adoptive parenting was sig-
nificantly different from biological parenting."23o 
Among legal commentators, the view was expressed that adopted 
children should be on an identical legal footing with biological chil-
dren. Thus, a number of writers criticized the inheritance laws of the 
time that limited adoptive children's rights to inherit through their 
adoptive relatives and permitted adopted children to continue inher-
iting from birth relatives. "In legal and social contemplation the child 
is taken from his natural family and made a member of a new family 
with full standing as though one of its blood." The laws of inheritance 
therefore should be "in furtherance of the currently prevailing social 
attitude that adoption effects a complete substitution of families.'>231 
229. See KIRK, supra note 195, at 152-53. His research suggested that acknowledg-
ment of differences in coping activities "are conducive to good communication and thus 
to order and dynamic stability in adoptive families," whereas rejection of differences 
"can be expected to make for poor communication with subsequent disruptive results 
for the adoptive relationship." Id. at 93. Kirk's book, as well as an empirical study in 
the early 1960s that noted that a greater proportion of adopted children sought mental 
health services, are credited with first stimulating widespread interest in the psychol-
ogy of adoption. See David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter, Preface to THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 191, at ix, x. Although Kirk's theory has been 
criticized, 
its importance cannot be denied. For one thing, it represented the first major 
theoretical effort to conceptualize adoptive family life, in contrast to earlier 
psychoanalytic writings on adoption which generally focused on the individ-
ual dynamics of children and parents. It also helped to normalize many of 
the adjustment difficulties among adoptees and adoptive parents. Finally, 
the theory was of critical importance in opening up the adoption process. 
Id. at x-xi. 
230. Kenneth W. Watson, Who Is the Primary Client?, PUB. WELFARE, Summer 
1979, at 11-12. 
231. Uhlenhopp, supra note 158, at 285 (asserting in inheritance context that rela-
tionship with natural parents be severed to promote "the completeness of the adoptive 
relationship"); Kuhlmann, supra note 171, at 248-49; see also, Recent Case, Adoption-
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The understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substi-
tute for creating a family through childbirth was supported by the 
partial swing of the pendulum in the first half of the century away 
from nature and toward nurture. A 1939 book that is part advice to 
prospective adopters and part academic study noted a former ten-
dency "to stress heredity and to discount environment"232 and advised 
instead: "What is done with a child after he is born counts more than 
the circumstances of his birth. He holds possibilities within himself 
which parental influence and general environment can either develop 
or crush. To Nature must be added Nurture."233 Identifying this swing 
toward nurture is not to suggest, of course, that potential adoptees 
were not carefully screened by agencies for mental or physical defects 
and "the grosser hereditary or congenital taints."z34 But apparently, 
this kind of pro-nurture advice was influential. "Adoptions are popu-
lar," the U.S. Children's Bureau proclaimed in 1955. "This wide-
spread interest reflects a drastic change in attitude during the past 
two or three decades."235 A professor of social welfare explained in 
1959 that the demand for children to adopt had greatly increased 
when the behavioral sciences could reliably assure adoptive parents 
that "parental morality or immorality was not genetically transmit-
ted, that the adopted child would reflect their behavior and attitudes 
rather than those of his natural parents, and that the child's illegiti-
mate birth status was not tantamount to his becoming a criminal, a 
sexual psychopath, or some other type of deviant."236 
The understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substi-
Descent and Distribution-Right to Inherit in a Dual Capacity When Adoptive Parent 
Is Blood Relative, 30 MINN. L. REV. 395, 396 (1946) (arguing that inheritance through 
natural parents should not be pennitted in order to further the notion that the adoptee 
be given complete legal status as a child of the adopting parents); Kiefer, supra note 
163, at 402-03 (alleging that failure to allow adoptive parents and relatives to inherit 
from adopted child stems from a failure to understand the necessity of "effecting a 
complete substitution of the adoptive for the natural parents"). 
232. BROOKS & BROOKS, supra note 42, at 12. 
233. Id. at 16. 
234. Id. at 21; see also Sokoloff, supra note 31, at 23. 
235. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 108, at 5. For a discussion of the pro-
traditional family, pro-natal ideology in the post-World War II period that was another 
factor contributing to the increasing popularity of adoption, see infra notes 237-44 and 
accompanying text. 
236. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 366. Reassurance was also provided to adopters by the 
psychological explanations that developed in the 1940s and 1950s for white unmarried 
mothers' pregnancies: "The biological stain of illegitimacy had been pennanent, but 
the neuroses of illegitimacy could be removed with help from a caseworker. The white 
out-of-wedlock child, therefore, was no longer a flawed by-product of innate immorality 
and low intelligence." RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY 
AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 152 (1992); see infra notes 245-56 and accompanying 
text. 
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tute for creating a family through childbirth was also encouraged in 
the immediate post-World War II generation, in the aftermath of 
wartime social and economic dislocations, by a pervasive pro-
traditional family and pro-natal ideology. In the light of this "post 
war family imperative,"237 adoption conferred the dual social benefit 
of creating the desired family group and offering a solution to the 
problem of unmarried mothers and their children.238 This pro-
traditional family, pro-natal ideology is very much evident in the 
documentary history of adoption. The 1959 book by a social welfare 
professor explained that because one of the major purposes of mar-
riage in Western culture is bearing and raising children, childless 
couples seek to adopt to fulfill their "unmet maternal and paternal 
needs," and "[t]he process of adoption then tends to complete the cul-
tural image of the most sanctified and revered of our social institu-
tions-marriage and the family."239 Or, as the Child Welfare League's 
1958 Standards for Adoption Service put it, "[a]doption as a means of 
creating families has had growing acceptance in our society. Great 
value is placed on children, and a family without children is consid-
ered incomplete."24o The League noted that while the demand for 
white infants greatly exceeded the number available, "many unmar-
ried mothers, as well as some married parents who find it necessary, 
are more ready than formerly to relinquish children for adoption."z41 
In a 1956 article on adoption practices in which the League's ex-
ecutive director Joseph H. Reid acknowledged that "[b]road cultural 
considerations have affected deeply the principles and convictions of 
[social service] agencies,"242 Reid offered an extreme example of this 
social mood, in terms that may sound cruelly conformist to our turn-
of-the-century ears: "A family in the United States is not considered 
complete or meaningful unless it has children. Childless couples have 
a multiplicity and diversity of pressures upon them to have chil-
dren .... It can be fairly said that it is not socially acceptable not to 
have them."243 As for the woman who gives birth outside of marriage, 
he continued: 
An agency has a responsibility of pointing out to the unmarried 
mother the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, if she re-
237. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 154. 
238. When one speaks of a pervasive ideology or social consensus, it is not to sug-
gest, of course, that there were not contrary views or dissension in the society. See, 
e.g., supra note 229 and accompanying text; infra note 244. 
239. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 368-69. 
240. 1958 STANDARDS, supra note 135, at 1. 
241. [d. 
242. Joseph H. Reid, Principles, Values, and Assumptions Underlying Adoption 
Practice, 1956 NAT'L CON. SOC. WORK 136. 
243. [d. 
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mains unmarried, of raising her child successfully in our culture 
without damage to the child and to herself .... The concept that 
the unmarried mother and her child constitute a family is to me 
unsupportable. There is no family in any real sense of the word.244 
The white unmarried mother was thus to some, with her "uncon-
tained female sexuality, ... a major threat to the middle-class fam-
ily."245 A new psychological view of the unmarried mother supported 
the idea that her child, when surrendered for adoption, should be 
completely and forever severed from the child's birth family. Al-
though not without some vigorous critics,246 this view of the unmar-
ried white mother was that she was mentally ill, had become preg-
nant on purpose, and was in need of treatment to recover and later 
attain normal family life within marriage. Black unmarried mothers, 
in contrast, tended to be viewed either as part of a cultural context in 
which out-of-wedlock birth was "an accepted way of life rooted in the 
cultural and economic legacies of slavery,"247 or as being biologically 
subject to "uncontrolled, sexual indulgence."248 Unmarried black 
mothers were generally expected to keep their babies, as most black 
and white unmarried mothers had done in an earlier era.249 
Popular psychoanalytic theories influenced developing ideas 
about white women's out-of-wedlock pregnancies in the 1940s and 
1950s:250 "[T]he unplanned pregnancy was understood to be a form of 
sexual acting out of unconscious needs and as such was seen as an 
expression of unresolved parent-child conflicts. Furthermore, it was 
assumed that the pregnancy represented significant psychopathology 
in the mother."251 Exhaustively canvassing professional literature, 
244. Id. at 139. Of course, these views were not wholly embraced by all. In a U.S. 
Children's Bureau report of a meeting of a group of social workers held in the same 
year, the point was emphasized that the argument for early placement of infants 
"rested on the presumption that the mother has had an opportunity to receive help in 
weighing alternatives, understanding her feelings, and reaching a good decision." UR-
SULA M. GALLAGHER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SOCIAL WORKERS 
LOOK AT ADOPTION 9 (1958). Discomfort over pressure for adoption was described by 
historian Solinger: "Some service providers felt the mandate was too coercively and too 
universally applied to white unmarried mothers." SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 155. 
There were objections to concentrating resources on adoption and not developing ser-
vices for unmarried mothers, and fears about unwed mothers without sufficient ser-
vices being "vulnerable to black marketeers interested only in making money off of 
them." Id. 
245. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 101. 
246. See, e.g., ISAAC, supra note 188, at 46-51. 
247. Anne B. Brodzinsky, Surrendering an Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother 
Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 191, at 295, 298. 
248. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 24. 
249. See id. at 151-52. 
250. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 297. 
251. Id.; see also CARP, supra note 5, at 114-16. 
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historian Rickie Solinger chronicled this development in her book on 
unmarried pregnancy and race. She detailed how this understanding 
was found attractive and useful by service providers.252 The unmar-
ried mother's baby could be seen as an object of the psychological 
problem,253 and the mentally unhealthy mother as ill-equipped to be a 
satisfactory mother for the baby.254 The unmarried mother, however, 
could be cured, and she should be rehabilitated, or redeemed, so that 
she might become marriageable once again. "Essentially, the cure for 
the white unmarried mother required three steps: remorse; relin-
quishment of the infant for adoption; and renewed commitment to 
fulfilling her destiny as a real woman."255 As a report of a U.S. Chil-
dren's Bureau conference rather starkly put it: 
Besides a humanitarian interest in helping girls in trouble, another 
important reason exists for being concerned about their future. 
Most of them are in the early years of their child-bearing period. 
Most of them will have other children, hopefully in wedlock. The 
community has a real stake in helping these girls become stable 
wives and mothers.256 
It is likely that it was both the understanding of adoption as a 
perfect and complete substitution for creating a family by childbirth, 
and the regime of secrecy created by nearly universal laws closing 
adoption records to birth parents, adoptive parents, and minor 
adoptees, that led to the association of negative social meanings with 
the acts of adult adoptees who sought information about birth fami-
lies. These negative meanings are evidenced both by professionals' 
view of adoptees who sought information about their birth families 
and by the social constraints those adoptees reported feeling when 
they undertook searches. From professional quarters, one source of 
disapprobation was the psychoanalytically influenced view that 
searching adoptees were the psychologically disturbed products of 
unsuccessful adoptions. The influential psychiatrist Viola Bernard 
wrote in 1953 that a normal adolescent's "need for connection with 
his past" can be satisfied by his adoptive parents giving him non-
identifying information or, if necessary, bringing him back to an 
252. See SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 86·186 passim. 
253. See id. at 96 ("[Tlhe baby ... was posited as simply an object of its mother's 
psychological disturbance."). 
254. See id. at 98 (stating how an unwed mother was seen as not being in a position 
to be an adequate parent to the child); see also CARP, supra note 5, at 115-16. 
255. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 94. There were those who expressed more sympa-
thy for the feelings ofthe surrendering unmarried mother. For example, the report of a 
1957 federal government-sponsored meeting of a small group of social workers admon-
ished social workers to "be aware of the pain and psychological implications inherent 
in separation and offer help and support through this troubled period." GALLAGHER, 
supra note 244, at 8. 
256. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 108, at 15. 
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agency that can provide more non-identifying details. However, 
"[o]ccasionally we see tragically pathological distortions ... very dis-
turbed young people who .. , develop an all-consuming, obsessing 
need to locate their biologic[al] parents who in fantasy, or even delu-
sion, have become the idealized good parents in contrast to the adop-
tive 'bad' parents with whom they are usually no longer in contact."257 
The "antidote" to such pathology is a good relationship between the 
adoptee and his adoptive parents. "In emotionally healthy adop-
tion ... the child's involvement with his biological parents remains 
within bounds."258 Although Bernard's view purported to be based on 
psychiatrist Florence Clothier's earlier work, it seems to go far be-
yond it. Dr. Clothier had simply speculated that the "family romance" 
of analytic literature may be more complex and difficult for the 
adopted child. The biological child can indulge in the fantasy that his 
parents are not his real parents "as in a game," secure in the love of 
his real parents, whereas the adopted child actually does have two 
sets of parents "and the correction of the foundling fantasy by reality 
is much less likely than in the own child."259 Social workers appar-
ently embraced the negative psychoanalytic view, however, as histo-
rian Carp documented through his research into the files of one 
agency. The agency's 1968 adoption manual characterized a search-
ing adult adoptee as "a person who 'has had many unhappy past ex-
periences and ... is so intent upon finding the natural parent that he 
is not able to consider his request in a realistic or rational way."'260 
Consequently, the manual advised caseworkers to discourage the 
search and then, if necessary, to refer the person for psychological 
treatment.261 
Adoptees felt discouraged from seeking information ''by the pre-
vailing mood of society at large, by social workers, and by adoptive 
parents that such interest was unnatural or showed ingratitude."262 
Adoptees' experience of this disapproving social attitude inspired the 
defensively defiant name of a large adoptees' rights organization: 
Bastard Nation. It is a central theme in the autobiographical ac-
counts by adoptees that are widely credited with spurring the move-
257. Viola W. Bernard, Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts to Adoption Agency 
Practice, in READINGS IN ADOPTION 395,430-31 (1. Evelyn Smith ed., 1963). For infor-
mation about Bernard's influential role, see CARP, supra note 5, at 130-34. 
258. [d. at 431. 
259. Florence Clothier, The Psychology of the Adopted Child, 27 MENTAL HEALTH 
231, 229-30 (1943); see Florence Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problem of Adoption, 9 
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 598,612-14 (1939). 
260. CARP, supra note 5, at 120. 
261. [d. 
262. Joseph D. Harrington, The Courts Contend with Sealed Adoption Records, PuB. 
WELFARE, Spring 1980, at 29, 31. 
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ment for greater openness in adoption.263 In her 1973 book The 
Search for Anna Fisher, a dramatic account of her more than twenty-
year search for her birth parents, Florence Fisher related her frus-
tration with the often unsympathetic and hostile receptions she re-
ceived through the years from the doctor and lawyer who arranged 
her adoption, hospital administrators, court personnel, and others. 
The doctor asked her: "Aren't you grateful? [Your parents] took you 
in when no one else wanted yoU."264 When she pleaded with a court 
clerk to see the file he was holding in his hand, he told her, "These 
records were sealed, and they'll stay sealed. You haven't got a chance 
in a million of ever getting to see these papers. You've got to get spe-
cial permission from the judge, lady, and he'll never give it to yoU."265 
Fisher's Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), according 
to one adoptee and social worker member, liberated her from "the 
conviction ... 'it was sick to be curioUS."'266 Another adoptee and so-
cial worker, who had found her birth family, catalogued negative 
views toward searching adoptees. She quoted an adoptive parent op-
posed to open records because "'[gJiving a hunting license usually 
portends ill for the quarry,'" another who "declared that [searching 
adoptees] appear to lack impulse control, not unlike thieves," and a 
lawyer who testified that an adoptee might use information "to find 
and murder his biological parent."267 
This disapproving social attitude is apparent in later judicial 
opinions as well. In one Missouri case, the court reported that an 
adoptee conceded she had not sought information from her adoptive 
parents "'because they would be hurt,'" but "risking that hurt and the 
possibility of disturbing their relationship, she commenced a 
search."268 In a companion case, a forty-eight-year-old adoptee argued 
that "'assurance for anonymity should not be preserved at the ex-
pense of the adoptee, for it is unjust that a child should suffer for the 
263. See, e.g., KITTSON, supra note 1; FISHER, supra note 215; LIFTON, supra note 
216. Paton and Lifton also wrote about the experiences of other adoptees. See JEAN M. 
PATON, THE ADOPTED BREAK SILENCE (1954); BETTY JEAN LIFTON, LOST AND FOUND: 
THE ADOPTION EXPERIENCE (1979). Paton and Fisher formed support and advocacy 
organizations. See PAUL SACHDEV, UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILES 1-2 (1989) (de-
scribing the roles of Paton and Fisher); WEGAR, supra note 34, at 74-75 (describing the 
role of autobiographical accounts in mobilization of the search movement). 
264. FISHER, supra note 215, at 63. 
265. Id. at 87. 
266. Annette Baran et aI., Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy, 
SOC. CASEWORK 531, 532 (1974) (quoting Babette Dalsheimer, Adoption Runs in My 
Family, Ms., Aug. 1973, at 82, 86). 
267. Small, supra note 186, at 41; see also, e.g., ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE 
ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES, BIRTH PAR-
ENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 146-49 (1978) (giving first-person accounts of search 
experiences in which adoptees experienced strong disapproval). 
268. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). 
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transgressions of his parents.",269 The court discerned in his argument 
"a casual indifference toward rights of the natural parents and ... a 
knowledge of improper conduct on their part, of which neither peti-
tioner nor this court have information and quite properly should 
not."270 
The negative social meanings associated with adult adoptees' in-
terest in information about birth families in turn were likely both re-
flected in and further fostered by the emerging understanding that 
lifelong secrecy was an essential feature of adoption. That this un-
derstanding became firmly established over time is confirmed by the 
way in which recent history has faded from collective memory.271 For 
example, the distinction between sealing court records to all persons 
and sealing birth records even to those whose births they register 
was lost. This loss of the distinction is evidenced by later statements 
in legal literature as well as later incidents in which state officials 
expressed confusion about or resisted statutory commands to provide 
adult adoptees with birth records. A law review article published in 
1975, for example, criticized a "lack of consistency" in statutes that 
"results from the fact that the sealed records statutes are generally 
found in both the adoption statutes and in the separate public health 
and records statutes."272 The author apparently included in this "in-
consistency" those statutory schemes that sealed court records com-
pletely, while permitting adult adoptee access to original birth re-
cords.273 Similarly, the author of a comment in 1978 recommended 
that "[s]uch inconsistency between confidentiality statutes under a 
state's domestic relations laws and statutes of disclosure under its 
vital statistics laws should be examined and corrected by state legis-
latures."274 
In Pennsylvania, the Department of Health sought the attorney 
general's opinion about the vital statistics law that provided access to 
original birth records "upon request of the person involved if he has 
attained majority and is not incompetent, or upon request of his par-
ent, guardian or legal representative.'>275 In 1978, the Pennsylvania 
attorney general responded that this law was not negated by a provi-
sion of the Commonwealth's adoption law concerning court records, 
under which "[am petitions, exhibits, reports, notes of testimony, de-
269. In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978) (en bane). 
270. Id. 
271. See infra Part N.B. 
272. Michael L. Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Di-
lemma, 2 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 542, 545 (1975) (footnote omitted). 
273. See id. 
274. James R. Carter, Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examina-
tion, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817, 821 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
275. 14 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 43 (1978). 
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crees, and other papers ... shall be ... withheld from inspection ex-
cept on an order of court granted upon good cause shown.,,276 The two 
laws "are not irreconcilable as a matter of law; nor have they been as 
a matter of practice."277 When the Pennsylvania legislature acted six 
years later to eliminate adult adoptee access to birth records, it did 
not amend the vital statistics provision, but instead passed a law de-
claring that the vital statistics provision was "repealed insofar as [it 
is] inconsistent with" the law "relating to impounding of [court] pro-
ceedings and access to records."278 Similarly in Oklahoma, an attor-
ney general's opinion was sought to answer the question whether the 
law did, as it appeared to, "confer upon an adopted person of legal 
age an absolute right, upon demand of the State Registrar, to see his 
original birth certificate."279 In New Hampshire, the attorney gen-
eral's opinion was sought in the mid-1960s. State law sealed adoption 
court records but not original birth records. State practice was that 
inspection of such birth records was at the discretion of the state reg-
istrar or the town clerk. The attorney general, relying on the statu-
tory provision sealing court records, advised that the registrar had 
the "authority and the duty" to direct town clerks not to cross refer-
ence original and amended certificates, making it impossible to fur-
nish original records to adoptees who did not already know their 
original surnames.280 
In Florida and Louisiana, adoptees went to court in the mid-
1970s to force records custodians to comply with laws requiring, re-
spectively, that the adoptee be "furnish[ed] the original birth certifi-
cate ... 'at the instance and request of the person whose birth is the 
subject of the said certificate"'281 and that the adoptee have access 
upon demand, by order of a court.282 Although the Florida court en-
forced the state statute, it noted "there may be compelling reasons 
supporting the [state custodian's] position."283 In Louisiana a year 
later, and in Florida four years later, legislatures eliminated adult 
adoptees' court confirmed right of access to the records.284 
276. [d. 
277. [d. 
278. 1984 Pa. Laws 195 (amending the Vital Statistics Laws of 1953). 
279. 14 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 204 (1982); see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying 
text. 
280. lOp. N.H. Att'y Gen. 186 (1966). 
281. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., Health Program Office v. Mullarkey, 
340 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
282. Chambers, 349 So. 2d at 426. 
283. Mullarkey, 340 So. 2d at 124. 
284. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 296; 1997 La. Acts 659. 
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B. From the 19608 
Ample evidence in the literature suggests that an adoptee's desire 
to know his biological roots is not idle curiosity of individuals who 
are psychologically and socially impaired ... but is nearly a univer-
sal phenomenon in normal personality development.285 
-Social work professor Paul Sachdev, 1989. 
Our Reunion Registry Databank is a multi-level, computerized, 
cross-linking system, containing the vital statistics of adoptees, 
natural parents and all persons separated by adoption for possible 
matching. . . . For example, if a mother who gave up a son born 
May 20, 1930 in St. Luke's Hospital, New York and an adopted 
male with matching information both register with us, we put them 
in touch without delay . 
. . . ALMA [Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association] has re-
united more than 100,000 families separated by adoption, and we 
take pride in our accomplishments.286 
-ALMA website, 2000. 
The understanding that lifelong secrecy was an essential feature 
of adoption continued to gain currency even as a social revolution 
was occurring, a revolution that challenged both lifelong secrecy and 
the understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substitute 
for creating a family by childbirth. Although some adoption agency 
practices287 were affected and some legislative changes were made,288 
of the twenty states that in 1960 had laws allowing adu~t adoptees 
access to original birth records, all but three nevertheless went on to 
join those states that had earlier eliminated the right.289 Only three 
states have since re-established an unqualified right of access to 
birth records:290 Tennessee in 1995, Oregon in 1998, and Alabama in 
285. SACHDEV, supra note 263, at 14-15. 
286. Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association, at http://www.almanet.com ("Regis-
try Databank" and "Membership Information" pages). The organization's registry is 
one of many available on the World Wide Web. The largest registry is the Interna-
tional Soundex Reunion Registry, which is available free of charge to searching 
adoptees and birth relatives. ISRR, http://www.isrr.com. For lists of registries and 
other search resources, and links to lists of registries and other search resources, see 
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org (American Adoption Congress website); 
http://www.bastards.org/library.search.htm (a page on the Bastard Nation website). 
287. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Cole & Kathryn D. Donley, History, Values, and Place-
ment Policy Issues in Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 192, at 
273,280-94 (discussing issues that arise during each stage of the adoption process). 
288. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of states' 
passive and active mutual consent registries). 
289. See supra notes 70-102 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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2000. Two have established a qualified right291 and seven others a 
qualified right of access only for adoptees in future adoptions.292 The 
persistence of lifelong secrecy and the related negative view of adult 
adoptee interest in birth families demonstrate the difficulty Professor 
Lessig describes of changing social meanings because of a conscious 
or unconscious tendency of "defensive construction," that is, a ten-
dency to preserve established but threatened meanings.293 
The understanding that lifelong secrecy was an essential feature 
of adoption, and the negative social meanings that were a function of 
that understanding, were defensively constructed by the actions of 
the states that in more recent years eliminated adult adoptees' right 
of access to birth records. The states reinforced both the threatened 
understanding and meanings by making the act of seeking informa-
tion unlawful. The understanding and meanings were defensively 
constructed in a more unconscious way by the emergence of a com-
mon, ahistorical idea about the development of secrecy in adoption-
the idea that from the earliest enactments establishing secrecy 
among the parties, a central purpose was to create a guarantee of or 
a right to lifelong anonymity for the birth parents. 294 Commentators 
and courts reflecting on the earlier passage of laws prohibiting par-
ties' general access to adoption records conveyed the impression not 
291. See supra note 24. 
292. See supra note 25. 
293. Lessig, supra note 204, at 1013; see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
294. See infra notes 356-88 and accompanying text. Other justifications advanced 
today for prohibiting adult access to birth records are that: (1) the prohibition relieves 
adoptive parents' fears that their children might, when they are grown, transfer their 
affections to their birth parents; (2) in the absence of the prohibition, birth parents ei-
ther will be discouraged from placing a child they would otherwise place for adoption, 
or will be encouraged to abort; and (3) potential adoptive parents will be discouraged 
from adopting. See Cole & Donley, supra note 287, at 292-93. It has also been argued 
that open records would lead to "a very sharp drop in the number and quality of adop-
tive" parent applicants because they "are quick to recognize that opening the sealed 
record changes their status from 'real' parents to that of long-term foster parents. The 
perennial and endemic fear of adoptive parents, namely, that they will lose their child 
to biological parents, will be enhanced and transformed into reality." Richard Zeilin-
ger, The Need Vs. the Right to Know, 37 PUB. WELFARE, Summer 1979, at 44, 46. Op-
ponents of the prohibition argue that in countries such as Great Britain and Israel and 
in the states that permit adult access, the "dire consequences predicted as a result of 
giving information have not occurred." Cole & Donley, supra note 287, at 293. As re-
ported by a lawyer for the birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees involved in 
the litigation over the Tennessee open records law, statistics in Kansas and Alaska, 
where adoptees have long had access to birth records, show that adoption rates "have 
been higher than those in the United States as a whole ... and abortion rates ... were 
lower than in the United States as a whole." Greenman, supra note 24, at 4; see also 
Jodi Nirode, Law Professor Pushes for Greater Access to Adoption Records, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, May 4, 2000, at 7C (discussing Joan Hollinger'S speech and adoption sym-
posium at which it was delivered). 
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only that these laws had provided some measure of anonymity for 
birth parents but also that assuring lifelong anonymity had been one 
of their primary goals.295 The later closings of birth records to adult 
adoptees, and all of the states' enactments of passive and active reg-
istry systems, reflected and fostered this more recent idea about life-
long secrecy in adoption. The social meanings associated with 
adoptee interest in birth families remained negative, no longer be-
cause of adoptees' pathology but instead because such interest was 
tied to and seen as an invasion of birth parents' interests. 
The social revolution that challenged and threatened to under-
mine lifelong secrecy has included a lessening of the stigma of ille-
gitimacy and a greater acceptance of single-parent and other non-
traditional types of families. 296 With respect to attitudes about adop-
tion, white unmarried motherhood is no longer equated with mental 
disorder or an ability to recover easily from surrendering a child for 
adoption.297 A large majority of birth parents are reported to be open 
to or actually desire contact with adoptees. 298 Adoptive families have 
come increasingly to be seen as having unique qualities and chal-
lenges.299 Thinking on human development has shifted back toward a 
greater emphasis on nature.300 Adoptees searching for information 
about or contact with their birth families have become familiar fig-
ures301 and are no longer assumed to be suffering from a mental dis-
order.302 Whether adoptees' expressed desires for identifying informa-
tion is in any sense innate or instinctive, as some have argued,303 or is 
purely culturally constructed,304 substantial and increasing numbers 
of adult adoptees since the 1960s have sought information about 
295. See infra notes 360-88 and accompanying text. 
296. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text. 
297. See Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 300-04; infra notes 317-20 and accompany-
ing text. 
298. See infra notes 321-28 and accompanying text. 
299. See infra notes 329-31 and accompanying text. 
300. See infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text. 
301. See infra notes 335-39 and accompanying text. 
302. See infra notes 340-50 and accompanying text. 
303. For example, psychiatrist Marshall D. Schechter and social worker Doris Ber-
tocci have argued on the basis of their own and others' research that 
[w lith the psychological need to separate pushed by the biological changes of 
adolescence, the dissonances and differences for the adoptee are highlighted 
and eventually create, in our view, a driven need to experience human con-
nectedness. This craving grows with time, experienced subjectively by some 
adoptees as equivalent to starvation .... The need to search has to do with a 
craving, much of it having innate sources .... 
Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 85; see also DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BE-
ING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF (1993). 
304. See infra note 314. 
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their birth parents.305 A nationwide advocacy movement seeking 
greater openness in adoption, including adult adoptee access to birth 
records, has grown steadily from its beginnings in the late 1960s and 
has involved both litigation and legislative advocacy.306 In the courts, 
individuals have sought to establish good cause for opening records,ao7 
and both individuals and groups have argued, without success to 
date, that closed records violate their constitutional rights.30S Mutual 
aid networks of searching adoptees and birth relatives have also pro-
liferated, expanding in recent years through the Internet.309 
Stories about searching and reuniting adoptees and birth rela-
tives are frequently featured in books, newspapers, magazines, tele-
vision programs, and movies.3Io The movement for greater openness, 
publicized and popularized in these ways, may be seen in effect, if not 
necessarily in intent, as a means of changing the social understand-
ing about lifelong secrecy by promoting changes in affiliated social 
meanings.3ll The evolution of social meaning is being affected by ty-
ing the act of seeking information to many sympathetic stories of in-
dividuals' searches and reunions,312 as well as to the broader and 
305. As early as 1976, a Child Welfare League official wrote about the "growing 
number" of adult adoptees "challenging the long·held practices for agency- and court· 
sealed adoption records." Rebecca Smith, Editorial, The Sealed Adoption Record Con· 
troversy and Social Agency Response, 55 CHILD WELFARE 73, 73 (1976). For a later re-
port of growing interest, see, e.g., SACHDEV, supra note 263, at 2-3. There are no de-
finitive statistics on the number or percentages of adolescent or adult adoptees who 
have actively searched or contemplated searching, or who might search in a different 
social and legal climate. Estimates of the percentage of adoptees who have searched or 
have wished to search range from fifteen to thirty-five. See Schechter & Bertocci, su-
pra note 191, at 67-68. A 1994 research report supported by the National Institute of 
Mental Health found in its study of 715 adoptive families and their 881 adopted ado-
lescents that "57% of the boys and 70% of the girls said they would like to meet their 
birth parents some day," although "only 10% said they thought about them often or 
would consider searching for them." 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1]. The 
methodology of the study has been criticized on a number of grounds, including a very 
high rate of non-response from adoptive families asked to participate in the study. See 
id.; March Wineman Axness, Growing Up Adopted: An Inquiry into Limitations, Inter-
pretations, and Implications of the Search Institute's 1994 Adoptive Family Study, 16 
DECREE (Am. Adoption Cong., Washington, D.C.), No.4, at 1 (1996). 
306. For accounts at various times of this movement, see C. Wilson Anderson, The 
Sealed Record in Adoption Controversy, 51 SOC. SERVICE REV. 141 (1977); Watson, su-
pra note 230, at 13-14; Harrington, supra note 262; Thompson, supra note 227, at 13; 
Watson, supra note 230, at 13-14. 
307. See infra notes 380-400 and accompanying text. 
308. For a recent review and analysis of constitutional arguments in support of 
open records, see Cahn & Singer, supra note 34. 
309. See supra notes 12, 280. 
310. See infra notes 329-33 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text. 
312. See Lessig, supra note 205, at 996-98. 
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long-standing societal emphasis on genealogy.313 Positive stories 
about adoptees and birth relatives searching for one another, as well 
as the formation of large numbers of mutual support and advocacy 
groups, are serving to lessen the social stigma and thus reduce the 
social coseJ4 individuals experience when they undertake searches. 
Among the most dramatic aspects of the larger social revolution 
are those associated with attitudes toward illegitimacy and single-
parent families. The "steady decline" of "restrictive and moralistic so-
cial attitudes about unplanned pregnancy" has been attributed to 
factors such as the "sexual revolution" of the 1960s, greater reproduc-
tive freedom, and the women's movement, as well as to an "increas-
ing social regard for women," financial benefits for single mothers, 
and an increase in the divorce rate that has made single-parent fami-
lies more common.315 A social work professor discussing adoption 
practices in 1966 evoked these changes when she asked: "Is it possi-
ble that ... social workers have been insensitive to an evolving mood, 
less condemnatory to the unmarried mother family? ... Is it possible, 
in short, that social workers have been operating on the basis of a 
presumed rather than a demonstrated need?,,316 
According to professional literature concerning birth mothers, as 
well as popular accounts both by and about them, many birth moth-
ers who surrender children for adoption suffer long-term psychologi-
cal consequences and many desire information about or contact with 
their surrendered children. Studies and anecdotal evidence also sug-
gest that high percentages of all birth parents are receptive to being 
contacted by adult adoptees. With respect to the emotional lives of 
birth mothers, a 1990 survey of psychological studies reported that 
the studies' anecdotal data were "consistent with previous profes-
313. As sociologist Katarina Wegar observed about the widespread publicity for 
adoption themes, particularly the theme of searching for birth parents, "[t]his publicity 
is essential to the search movement: not only does it evoke sympathy and support, but 
it promotes curiosity among adoptees about their biological origins." WEGAR, supra 
note 34, at 72. 
314. Wegar concluded that adoptees' "need to know [is] as much social as it is in-
nate," and must be expected in our culture. 
Considering the weight attributed to the biological underpinnings of par-
ent-child relationships in this society, it is both cruel and unreasonable to 
expect adoptees and their biological parents to feel otherwise. 
Although arguments concerning the biological origins of the need to know 
remain speculative, we can be sure that in this society knowledge about ge-
netic heritage is generally regarded and experienced as an important part of 
a person's identity, perhaps even as an archetypal yearning. 
WEGAR, supra note 34, at 136-37. 
315. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 298; see also NANCY E. Down, IN DEFENSE OF 
SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 103-16 (1977). 
316. Madison, supra note 181, at 342. She even suggested that "[p]erhaps ... one-
parent families could offer new hope for hard-to-place children." Id. at 347. 
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sional documentation of profound and protracted grief reactions, de-
pression, and an enduring preoccupation with and worry about the 
welfare of the child .... These findings strongly suggest[ed] that, for 
many women, the experience of surrendering an infant for adoption 
is a nearly intolerable 10ss."317 Women who adoption agency personnel 
had assumed could "put the experience behind them"31B later began 
"to emerge from long years of silence to express sorrow, anger, and 
regret."319 They explained "their previous reluctance to come forward 
as the outcome of both spoken and unspoken prohibitions coming 
from adoption caseworkers, family members, mental health workers, 
the religious community, and society in general."320 
A number of small studies in the 1970s suggested that a sub-
stantial majority of birth parents who had been located by their sur-
rendered children were accepting of being found. The studies also 
showed that a substantial majority of uncontacted birth parents 
would be willing to meet their children.321 These studies were cited to 
and reported by authors of legal periodical articles favoring greater 
openness in adoption.322 A sizeable study published in 1989 found 
evidence "shattering the prevailing myth that birth mothers are un-
concerned about the child they relinquished .... [E]y and large birth 
mothers feel a continuing sense of loss and would like to reunite with 
their child .... "323 Almost ninety percent of the birth mothers studied 
favored being contacted on behalf of their surrendered children.324 
Recently, statistics compiled by intermediary programs have indi-
317. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 304; see also, e.g., Loverett Millen & Samuel 
Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55 AMER. J. OR-
THOPSYCHIATRY 411 (1985). For autobiographical accounts, see, e.g., MERRY BLOCH 
JONES, BIRTHMOTHERS (1993); CAROL SCHAEFER, THE OTHER MOTHER: A WOMAN'S 
LOVE FOR THE CHILD SHE GAVE UP FOR ADOPTION (1991). 
318. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 295. 
319. Id. at 298-99. 
320. Id. 
321. See LAURIE WISHARD & WILLIAM R. WISHARD, ADOPTION: THE GRAFTED TREE 
166 (1979) (referring to a 1976 study stating that eighty-two percent of birth parents 
would be willing to meet with adult adoptees); Arthur D. Sorosky et aI., The Effects of 
the Sealed Record in Adoption, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 900,901 (1976) (stating that in 
a survey of fifty adult adoptees, eighty-two percent of birth parents were "positive and 
accepting," and only ten percent reacted "adversely" to the reunion with their surren-
dered children); Thompson, supra note 227, at 14 ("[C]ontrary to commonly expressed 
fears, most birth families were reasonably accepting of being found."). 
322. See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 272, at 547-48; Elton B. Klibanofl; Genealogical 
Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 195 
(1977) (stating that in searches initiated by birth parents, "studies indicate that most 
biological mothers say they would be willing to participate in a future meeting with 
the child ifit would be helpful to the child's welfare"). 
323. SACHDEV, supra note 263, at 178. 
324. Id. 
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cated that as many as ninety-five percent of birth parents are open to 
contact.325 In Hawaii, an intermediary in the state's active registry 
system reported in 1992 that when she contacts birth parents, "the 
most typical reaction ... is great joy, crying, and 'This is the call I've 
been waiting for.",326 These themes of the continuing concern experi-
enced by many birth parents, and their desire for or acceptance of 
contact with their adult children, are prominent in popular accounts 
of birth mothers' experiences such as Carol Shaefer's autobiographi-
cal work, The Other Mother,327 which was made into a television 
movie, and the study, BirthBond, which documented birth mothers' 
reunions with their children.328 
The formation of families through adoption is no longer seen in 
the professional literature as a perfect and complete substitute for 
creating families through childbirth. "The traditional view held that 
adoption emulated the genetic birth experience. The adopted child 
was indistinguishable from children born to a family .... The emerg-
ing view[] holds that adoption is a unique, life long experience, not to 
be confused with genetic experience."329 Adopted children have to cope 
with "the reality that they have two families," and "[a]doptive par-
ents are encouraged to join their children in dealing with this fact 
and to use the process to increase their attachment to the children 
they have adopted."330 Commenting as early as 1974 on a trend to-
ward greater openness, a Child Welfare editorial opined that "[t]he 
325. In litigation over the Tennessee open records law, birth parents, adoptive par-
ents, and adoptees who defended the law used statistics compiled by confidential in-
termediary programs to offer evidence that ninety-five percent of birth parents wanted 
to be contacted by their children. See Greenman, supra note 24, at 3 (stating that the 
figures were also confirmed by Connecticut Law Revision Commission data); see also 
G. William Troxler, Human Rights & Responsibilities in Adoption, available at 
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/regional.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001). 
Troxler stated that New Jersey officials reported 94.9% of 350 living birth family 
members contacted in a four-year period wanted contact if adoptees requested it. Id. In 
4097 contacts with birth mothers between 1981 and 1996, 7.5% refused contact with 
adoptees. Id. The South Dakota state official who assisted adoptees seeking identifying 
information reported in an interview that no problems have arisen there after 
adoptees received information. She said adoptees have been cautious and considerate 
in their use of the information and in their approaches to birth relatives. See Tele-
phone Interview with Kleinsasser, supra note 71. 
326. Lum, supra note 57, at 519. The searcher estimated that "less than five percent 
of birth parents immediately relay (over the telephone) a desire to remain confidential. 
Moreover, in the majority of the cases, after the initial shock wears off, the birthparent 
changes his or her mind." Id. 
327. SCHAEFER, supra note 317. 
328. JUDITH S. GEDIMAN & LINDA P. BROWN, BIRTHBoND: REUNIONS BETWEEN 
BIRTHPARENTS AND ADOPTEES-WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ... (1989) (providing first-hand 
accounts of the experiences shared by birthmothers). 
329. Cole & Donley, supra note 287, at 280. 
330. Id. 
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creation of families based on psychological, not blood, ties contains 
inherent identity problems that practice and law seek to mitigate but 
can never eliminate."331 The human development pendulum also 
changed direction, swinging somewhat further away from nurture 
and closer to nature.332 Whereas studies of adoptee adjustment in the 
late 1940s through the early 1960s concentrated on "environmental 
factors ... almost to the exclusion of genetic factors," since the mid-
1960s "interest [has] swung toward elucidation of genetic factors in 
adoptee psychopathology (and by extension to adoptee adjust-
ment)."333 A psychiatrist reviewing this more recent professional lit-
erature concluded, "[t]he older view that children are a 'tabula rasa' 
as far as behavior, socialization, and the like are concerned would 
appear to be invalid."334 
The image of adoptees searching for information about or contact 
with their birth families has become a more familiar one and is no 
longer assumed to indicate mental disorder or even dissatisfaction 
with the adoption experience.335 In the 1960s and 1970s, autobio-
graphical and journalistic accounts "developed momentum in the 
popular literature."336 A plethora of autobiographical books and arti-
cles have chronicled searches for and reunions with biological rela-
tives, from Jean Paton's, Florence Fisher's, and Betty Jean Lifton's 
groundbreaking books in the 1950s and 1960s,337 to recent accounts 
such as one by writer and former NFL star Tim Green.338 As sociolo-
gist Katarina Wegar notes, "[t]he adoption theme, particularly the 
theme of searching for birth parents, has emerged as a compelling 
human-interest story and has inspired myriad novels, plays, and 
movies. "339 
331. Carl Schoenberg, On Adoption and Identity, 53 CHILD WELFARE 549 (1974). 
332. See, e.g., Helen Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through Knowl· 
edge, 16 Soc. WORK 73, 79 (1971) (arguing that adoptive parents have a right to in-
formation about adoptees' heredity in order to minimize the risks they are expected to 
take). 
333. Remi J. Cadoret, Biologic Perspectives of Adoptee Adjustment, in THE PSy· 
CHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 191, at 25, 28-29. 
334. Id. at 39. The author continued: "Not that environment is unimportant. It de-
monstrably is important and hopefully, with the aid of studies of adoptees, the role of 
environment (as well as genetics) in human behavior will continue to be clarified fur-
ther." Id. at 39-40. 
335. See, e.g., Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 62-90. 
336. [d. at 66. 
337. See supra note 263. 
338. TIM GREEN, A MAN AND HIS MOTHER: AN ADOPTED SON'S SEARCH (1997). 
339. WEGAR, supra note 34, at 72. As early as 1979, it was noted that "[i]n the past 
few years there has been an increasing number of newspaper and magazine articles 
dealing with the adoptee's wish to know about and possibly to find his family of birth. 
T.V. and films, sensing the emotional pull of the topic, have used the theme fre-
quently." Thompson, supra note 228, at 13. 
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In the 1970s, authoritative voices began characterizing adoptees' 
interest in their birth families as both normal and perhaps even im-
portant to satisfy. An academic observer in 1977 reported that 
"[ w ]hile the effort to gain access to the sealed record in adoption has 
been initiated and sustained by adoptees themselves, support for 
their efforts has emerged from both social work and the law."34o A 
committee of the American Academy of Pediatrics reported in 1971 
"evidence that the adopted child retains the need for seeking his an-
cestry for a long time."341 Influential articles were published in the 
1970s by a team of researchers-two social workers and a psychia-
trist: Annette Baran, Reuben Pannor, and Arthur D. Sorosky. They 
advocate open records in their work, arguing that adoptees are espe-
cially vulnerable to identity conflicts, that closed records lead to psy-
chological problems, and that successful searches benefit most of the 
adoptees who conduct them as well as their birth parents.342 Simi-
larly, a mid-1970s Canadian study stated that "an adoptee's need to 
know about his or her birth family was a normal and natural piece of 
the adoption phenomenon and was not restricted to those adoptees 
who [have] had unhappy adoption experiences."343 Editorials in the 
Child Welfare League of America's publication counseled that the 
sealed records controversy must be viewed with an open mind that 
considers "the possibility that adult adoptees may be right in de-
manding elimination of secrecy."344 Further, in light of the existence, 
inter alia, of inherent identity problems and the discontent of some 
adult adoptees, a day might come when almost all adoptions would 
be open from the outset.345 Also in the mid-1970s, a study of adopted 
persons in Scotland ,346 where birth records had been open since 
1930,347 influenced the passage in 1975348 of a law that opened records 
340. Anderson, supra note 306, at 143. 
341. Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 140 n.18 (citing Comm. on Adoptions, 
Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Identity Development in Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 
948 (1971)). 
342. See, e.g., SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 267; Baran et ai., supra note 266; Baran 
et ai., Open Adoption, SOC. WORK 97 (1976); Sorosky et ai., supra note 321. For a dis-
cussion of their work and influence, see CARP, supra note 5, at 148. 
343. Thompson, supra note 227, at 14. 
344. Smith, supra note 305, at 74. 
345. See Schoenberg, supra note 331, at 549. 
346. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 188. 
347. See id. at 1. 
348. See Carolyn Burke, Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know 
His Origins, 48 So. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1203-04 (1975) (stating that because of a study 
done in Scotland, a legislative committee drafted recommendations to revise laws in 
England and Wales to allow adoptees to receive "a copy of[theirl original birth certifi-
cate" at age eighteen). 
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in England and Wales as well. 349 Today, social service and other social 
science literature continues not to speak in terms of pathology. A re-
view of more recent studies of searching adoptees showed instead 
merely disagreement about whether "the need to search is found pre-
dominantly among adoptees with unsatisfactory adoptive experi-
ences," and "agreement that when a search is completed it usually re-
sults in significantly improved psychological changes within the 
adoptee."35o 
In "the growing number of articles favorable to the adoptee's 
quest" that began to appear in law periodicals in the 1970s,351 legal 
commentators noted adoptees' growing interest in and advocacy for 
obtaining identifying information, as well as the increasing media at-
tention paid to the issue.352 The authors premised their analyses on 
the notions that the interest of many adoptees in identifying infor-
mation is natural and that the inability to satisfy that interest can 
lead to psychological difficulties. As one wrote, "There is growing rec-
ognition that adoptees feel a greater lack of biological continuity than 
has been previously accepted, and that these feelings cannot be dis-
counted as occurring only in maladjusted or emotionally disturbed 
individuals."353 With respect to the effect of sealed records on adult 
adoptees, a Maryland judge explained that the "wellspring of the at-
tack on sealed record statutes lies in the growing recognition of psy-
chological impairment occasioned by the denial of access to informa-
tion regarding birth origin."354 A Midwestern practitioner described 
349. Children Act, 1975, c. 72 (Eng.) (allowing adoptees at age eighteen to obtain 
birth records). 
350. Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 71 (emphasis added). 
351. Anderson, supra note 306, at 143. 
352. See, e.g., James J. Bianco Jr. et ai., The New Hampshire Adoption Statute: An 
Overview, 18 NEW HAMpSHIRE B.J. 199, 225-26, 229 (1977) (discussing the increasing 
interest of adoptees in the search movement); Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 186 (com-
menting on the media attention and the movement for and against open records); 
Burke, supra note 348, at 1196-97 (identifying an increase in searching, advocacy, and 
publicity); Carter, supra note 274, at 837 (noting an increase in adoptees seeking ac-
cess to records); Ruth Clement Scheppers, Comment, Discovery Rights of the Adoptee-
Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN FERN. V. L. 
REV. 65 (1975) (discussing the movement for open records). 
353. Scheppers, supra note 352, at 68; see also, e.g., Burke, supra note 348, at 1196 
(stating the compelling psychological need of many to learn natural heritage); Lupack, 
supra note 66, at 219, 228 (discussing the deep-seated need of many to learn identity). 
354. Marshall A. Levin, The Adoption Trilemma: The Adult Adoptee's Emerging 
Search for His Ancestral Identity, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 496, 498-99 (1979); see also, e.g., 
Hanley, supra note 272, at 546 (noting the possibility of an identity crisis due to lack of 
knowledge); Lupack, supra note 66, at 218-19 (acknowledging that a lack of knowledge 
can impede identity development); Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 139 (dis-
cussing the serious psychological problems). 
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some adoptees' "years of agonizing searching and depression."355 
Despite these changing popular and professional views of 
adoptees' seeking information, the social understanding of lifelong 
secrecy as an essential feature of adoption persisted and states con-
tinued to close birth records to adult adoptees. Observing the phe-
nomenon of a state closing birth records in this period, one article in 
1977 puzzled, "it is surprising Connecticut would change its law in 
light of the current mode of openness with respect to adoptive re-
cords .... Connecticut has reported ... very few problems with pro-
spective adoptive parents because of the openness of the statute."356 
An earlier article reported that "no problems resulted to either the 
adopted person or his natural parents following the disclosure of the 
latter's identity."357 But the threatened understanding about lifelong 
secrecy was being shored up by a contemporarily plausible rationale. 
In what can be seen as reflecting a "defensive construction"358 of a so-
cial understanding and its affiliated social meanings, judicial opin-
ions and legal commentaries conveyed the impression that, as a rule, 
the prohibitions on parties' access to records and adult adoptees' ac-
cess to birth records occurred simultaneously. They indicated that 
these measures were undertaken to guarantee birth parents' lifelong 
anonymity, as well as for other reasons such as the need to protect 
the adoptive family from potential interference by birth parents. 
Therefore, adoptee interest in birth families seriously impinged on 
birth parents' interests. Lifelong secrecy had become so entrenched 
in the 1970s that the rhetoric and reasoning of most judicial opinions 
and legal periodical articles made it seem as if there had never been 
a time when a chorus of expert voices recommended sealing records 
but allowing adult adoptees access to original birth records. These 
opinions and commentaries made it seem as if there had never been 
long periods in many states, only recently concluded in some and on-
going in others, when the recommendation for allowing adult 
adoptees access had been followed without apparent harm either to 
individuals or to the institution of adoption.359 
The legal commentaries typically discussed the closing of adop-
tion records as a unitary event, without acknowledging distinctions 
among agency, court, and birth records. One article explained that 
"the practice of closing the records was initiated, and procedures 
355. C.L. Gaylord, The Adoptive Child's Right to Know, CASE & COMMENT, Mar.-
Apr. 1976, at 38, 44 (asserting adopted children should have a legal right to inquire 
into their origin). 
356. Bianco et al., supra note 352, at 231. 
357. Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 150 (citing a letter from a state 
adoption official). 
358. Lessig, supra note 204; see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
359. See infra notes 360-400 and accompanying text. 
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were started to protect the privacy and permanency of the adoption 
process. Records ... became available to adopted persons to see only 
if reasonable cause could be shown."36o One comment noted that "a 
major purpose of the confidentiality statutes [was] to keep the iden-
tity of the biological parents secret."361 An influential 1977 article in 
the Family Law Quarterly referred to "decades of policy protecting 
the anonymity of the biological parents."362 Authors based the analy-
ses in their articles on the existence of a general "right to anonym-
ity,"363 "guarantee of anonymity,"364 and "right to remain anony-
mous."365 Authors stated without citation or further explanation that 
many mothers "relinquished their children with a clear assurance of 
anonymity."366 Nevertheless, some of the authors concluded that a 
right of access for adult adoptees, based on either a constitutional 
right or a statutory right, should trump desires for, expectations of, 
or rights to anonymity on the part of birth parents and a correspond-
ing state interest in sparing birth parents from distressing or disrup-
tive reunions.367 Some authors recommended systems in which inter-
mediaries would obtain information and make contacts.36S 
In the reported opinions concerning secrecy in adoption that be-
gan appearing in the 1970s,369 the courts also wrote in terms of birth 
parents' "right to privacy"37o and "statutory guarantee of anonymity 
and confidentiality."371 Opinions discussed the development of secrecy 
among the parties as a single legal event intended to promote the in-
terests of all the members of the adoption triangle-adoptees, adop-
tive parents, and birth parents-and the derivative interests of the 
360. Bianco et aI., supra note 352. 
361. Carter, supra note 274, at 845. 
362. Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 196 (emphasis added). 
363. Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 148. 
364. Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 195. 
365. Bianco et aI., supra note 352, at 233-34. 
366. Scheppers, supra note 352, at 76. 
367. See, e.g., Gaylord, supra note 355, at 44; Burke, supra note 348, at 1197; Lu-
pack, supra note 66, at 217; Jackie L. Payne Sr., Note, Adoptees: Have We Forgotten 
that They Are Human Also?, 4 S.U. L. REV. 104, 113 (1977) (advocating open records 
laws); Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 144-49 (stating that there may be a con-
stitutional right to know). 
368. See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 272, at 553; Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 197-98; 
Carter, supra note 274, at 852-53. 
369. See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Restricting Access to Ju-
dicial Records of Concluded Adoption Proceedings, 83 A.L.R.3d 800 (1978). 
370. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (holding statute that placed birth certificates under seal did not vio-
late adoptees' rights to privacy, to receive important information, or to equal protec-
tion). 
371. In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203, 1205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (denying adult 
adoptees' motion to inspect adoption records). 
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society in an effective and lawful adoption system. As a Rhode Island 
court typically outlined, in a case in which a birth mother sought in-
formation about her eleven-year-old child, lifelong secrecy gives the 
birth parent "assurance that his or her identity will not become pub-
lic knowledge" and "an opportunity to restructure his or her life after 
a most traumatic episode."372 It allows adoptive parents to raise the 
child "free from interference from the natural parents and without 
any apprehension that the birth status of their child will be used to 
harm themselves or the child."373 It "protects the adoptee from any 
possible stain of illegitimacy and permits the formation of a relation-
ship with the new parents ... free of the threat of outside interfer-
ence" of a birth parent. 374 
Rejecting adoptees' constitutional challenges to sealed records, 
some courts suggested, to the contrary, that the states' important in-
terest in protecting the privacy of birth parents might itself be "com-
pelling" in constitutional terms.375 Even in a state in which birth re-
cords had been available to adult adoptees until two years earlier, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court stressed in 1979 that the court, rather 
than the adoptee, should undertake inquiries concerning whether he 
had a right to inherit from "blood relatives" because, among other 
reasons, it could be that the birth parents were "assured of perma-
nent anonymity" and "that either or both may have a right to per-
sonal privacy which includes a right to remain anonymous."376 Courts 
also articulated related societal concerns that granting access to 
identifying information to adult adoptees could somehow reduce the 
availability of adoptive families or drive birth parents either to keep 
their children or resort to abandonment or black market transac-
tions, in situations in which the best interest of the children would be 
served by lawful adoption proceedings.377 A dissenter in the Louisiana 
case, however, did observe that "for several decades an adoptive child 
has had the right to learn his parentage (before the recent 1977 
amendments to the statute), without noticeable effect on inhibiting 
adoptions."378 "[I]t might be argued," the justice added, "that the so-
cial values involved in protecting the anonymity of the blood parents 
372. In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511, 513 (R.I. 1979); see also Sage, 586 P.2d at 1203-
04; Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (denying adult 
adoptees' motion to unseal records for failure to show good cause). 
373. In re Christine, 397 A.2d at 513. 
374. See id. 
375. ALMA Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
sealed records law was not unconstitutional). 
376. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979). 
377. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978); Bradey, 274 S.E.2d at 
421. 
378. Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1316 n.2 (Tate, J., dissenting). 
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are adequately served by preserving their identity for the first 
twenty years of their child's life."379 
Whether deciding adoptees' petitions to open records for good 
cause or adoptees' claims of constitutional rights, the courts spoke in 
terms of weighing the interests of adoptees against a privacy interest 
of birth relatives,38o although no statutes required notice to or a hear-
ing for birth relatives before opening records. The weighing process 
is, of course, a peculiar one in which the courts compare the interests 
of persons before the court with interests of unknown, unrepresented 
persons who, as some opinions recognized, might not object to the re-
lease of information or might even joyfully welcome a reunion.381 Per-
haps one of the only state statutes that suggested the possibility of 
locating and consulting birth parents was New York's provision that 
court records could be opened "for good cause shown after due notice 
has been given to 'the adoptive parents and to such additional per-
sons as the court may direct."'382 The New York Court of Appeals held 
that birth parents should be sought by the court only if a petitioning 
adoptee has first shown good cause for opening the records and if 
"the natural parents can be located with reasonable effort and in a 
manner that will not be likely to be self-defeating by revealing their 
identities to the adoptive parents or others."383 If these conditions 
were satisfied, then notice to the birth parents would provide them 
"an opportunity to intervene through a representative ... and defend 
their interest in retaining anonymity."384 Courts in Louisiana, Mis-
souri, and Rhode Island also approved the use of intermediaries to 
379. Id. 
380. See In re Linda F.M., 401 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (holding that suit 
tq.unseal records may proceed even without notice to birth parents if birth parents are 
not easily accessible and noting in dicta that the presence ofthe Attorney General pro-
vides an adequate adversarial atmosphere); Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236; Massey, 369 
So.2d at 1314-15; In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 763; Bradey, 274 S.E.2d at 421; Mills, 
372 A.2d at 651; In re Sage, 586 P.2d at 1204. 
381. See, e.g., Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236; In re Linda F.M., 401 N.Y.S.2d at 962; In re 
Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1389 (R.I. 1986) (holding that adoptee's curiosity about natu-
ral parents was not good cause for opening sealed records). 
382. In re Anonymous, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (quoting N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAw § 114(2) (McKinney 1999) (holding that good cause was shown when infor-
mation was necessary to adult adoptee's mental rehabilitation); see also supra note 85 
(citing 1974 Connecticut statute, which provided for showing good cause "ex parte or 
with such notice the court deems advisable"). 
383. In re Linda F.M., 418 N.E.2d at 1304. 
384. Id. (citation omitted). The decision appeared to overrule the procedure used by 
a surrogate court in an earlier case in which the court, without first requiring a good 
cause showing, ordered an investigation to locate the birth mother and determine 
whether she would be willing to see her daughter. See In re Maxtone-Graham, 393 
N.Y.S.2d 835, 836-37 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (allowing disclosure of agency records where 
natural mother had consented). 
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contact birth parents in cases in which good cause was first demon-
strated.385 The Missouri Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is difficult 
to perceive a case in which circumstances would warrant disclo-
sure ... unless" the birth parent has waived the confidentiality of the 
records.386 Most courts simply weighed the interests of adoptees seek-
ing identifying information against a presumed interest of birth par-
ents in anonymity. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, in a de-
cision rejecting a constitutional challenge to the state's sealed records 
laws, found "that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in con-
cluding that [the adoptee's] desire to obtain release of the records 
should not prevail over the potential infringement of the rights of 
other parties."387 In that case, the adoptee's adoptive mother sup-
ported his search; his adoptive sister had searched for, found, and 
was enjoying relationships with both her families; and his adoption 
had taken place in 1949, twelve years before Illinois closed original 
birth records to adult adoptees.388 
The courts also faced the difficult task, with essentially no guid-
ance from state legislatures, of divining what might constitute good 
cause for revealing information in sealed records. The history and 
analysis presented in this Article confirm that when many of the re-
cord-sealing laws were passed, legislators neither sought to remedy 
problems associated with adult adoptee access to identifying informa-
tion nor specifically considered whether or why adult adoptees would 
seek or should be entitled to information. Some state statutes pro-
vided no standard for opening court or birth records; some required 
"good cause" for court records but enunciated no standard for opening 
birth records.389 In the absence of any standard, courts interpreted 
statutes as requiring good cause.390 A few statutes supplied other 
385. See, e.g., Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1314-15 (finding the right to inherit from blood 
relative to be compelling reason for a curator ad hoc to investigate birth records, and 
that birth parents may be indispensable parties); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 766 (au-
thorizing a confidential inquiry when factual situation justifies an opportunity to par-
ticipate anonymously in proceeding); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1390 (finding that if 
adoptee had shown compelling need and connection of psychological problems to lack 
of information, birth parents must have opportunity to intervene). In New Jersey, a 
1977 decision of the superior court, chancery division, outlined a procedure for contact-
ing birth parents in every case, but a later decision of the same court declined to follow 
the earlier case. Backes v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283, 294 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (finding no showing of good cause). 
386. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 766. 
387. In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. 1981) (holding that sealing statute was 
constitutional because it was rationally related to the legitimate legislative interest of 
protecting adoption and it did not violate the adoptee's constitutional rights). 
388. See In re Roger B., 407 N.E.2d 884, 886, 890 n.7 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), affd, 418 
N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981). 
389. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 752-53; Backes, 509 A.2d at 291 n.2. 
390. "The statute, unlike those of several other States does not explicitly provide a 
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types of minimal guidance, such as providing that records may be in-
spected or information disclosed "only ... when the court is satisfied 
that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected,"391 
or if it is in "the best interest of the child or of the public" to do SO.392 
The courts themselves did not develop many more concrete guide-
lines. As one judge commented, "judicial considerations by other 
courts as to 'sealed records' statutes are limited and of little help."393 
Another explained that "[t]here is no precise definition of 'good cause' 
either by statute or case law, rather, the judge must make this de-
termination on a case-by-case basis. Flexibility is desirable in this 
sensitive area. The court is vested with wide discretion .... "394 In 
keeping with the social understanding that lifelong secrecy is an es-
sential feature of adoption, courts in reported opinions uniformly re-
jected "mere curiosity,"395 however keen, and found few specific rea-
sons that did or might constitute good cause. Among the reasons a 
small number of appellate courts accepted were a psychological need 
to knoW,a95 or more commonly, severe psychological problems caused 
by lack of information;397 a right to inherit from natural relatives;398 
and a religiously based need to trace ancestors.399 References to trial 
court orders that released identifying information can be found in a 
number of opinions and other sources, but the reasons for and the 
numbers of such orders cannot be determined. 40o 
In the social service arena, there has been discussion since the 
good-cause standard .... Although we find no Illinois cases interpreting the standard 
to be applied, we agree that the discretion conferred by the statute was intended to be 
exercised upon a showing of good cause." In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 752-53 (citation 
omitted); see also Harrington, supra note 262, at 30 & n.2. 
391. In re Wells, 281 F.2d 68,70 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (quoting relevant statute prohibit-
ing inspection of sealed records except upon court's finding that the welfare of child 
would be protected or promoted). 
392. In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479,481 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting relevant stat-
ute and finding that the best interests of the child were not adequately considered). 
393. Id. at 482. 
394. Sage, 586 P.2d at 1206. 
395. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 655; In re Linda F.M., 409 N.Y.S.2d at 642. 
396. See, e.g., Estate of Dodge v. Comerica Bank, 413 N.W.2d 449, 584 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1987) (finding a psychological need entitled adoptee to hearing on issue of open-
ing records). 
397. See, e.g., Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1388-89. 
398. See, e.g., Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1314. 
399. See In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978) (holding that religious need 
could be good cause sufficient to open records). For a general discussion of reported 
and unreported "good cause" cases decided in the 1970s, see Harrington, supra note 
262. For a discussion of such cases up to the present time, see Karnezis, supra note 
369. 
400. See, e.g., Rossignol v. Comm'r of Human Servs., 495 A.2d 788, 789 (Me. 1985) 
(denying motion for further inspection after adult adoptee had already ascertained 
identity of birth mother); Sorosky et aI., supra note 267, at 151. 
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1960s about promises or assurances made by agencies to unmarried 
mothers that identifying information about them would not be re-
vealed in the future to the children they surrendered for adoption. 
These discussions pertain generally to social workers' professional 
confidentiality standards and practices with respect to their own re-
cords,401 although it is certainly possible some agencies or other in-
termediaries had made representations about laws governing court 
and birth records laws. In a 1975 article, a professor of social work 
recounted that unmarried mothers did not anticipate that the sur-
rendered child would be re-introduced into her life "at some unpre-
dictable time.''402 Discussing the possibility of agencies providing in-
formation in the future to adult adoptees, she continued, "[m]others 
who have already given their children up for adoption have been 
given assurances about privacy and confidentiality that must be re-
spected.''403 A 1975 Child Welfare League survey of adoption agencies 
asked what should be done if a choice had to be made between a 
"[b]iological mother's right to anonymity" and an "[a]dult adoptee's 
right to know who was his or her biological mother." Fifty-seven per-
cent of the agencies said they would consider the mother's right 
paramount, while 27% would consider the adoptee's paramount, and 
16% "didn't know." Respondents were more divided on the normative 
question of whether agencies ideally should conduct a search for bio-
logical parents on the adoptee's behalf (14% usually, 53% sometimes, 
19% never), or simply give the adoptee identifying information (9% 
usually, 40% sometimes, and 34% never).404 
The League's 1978 revision of its standards continued to support 
sealed adoption records,405 although by 1988, it was advising agencies 
to advocate both for laws shifting the burden of proof from adoptees 
to birth parents and for laws under which adult adoptees could be 
given information either after birth parents' consent is obtained or 
after a diligent but unsuccessful search for the birth parents.406 Then 
in 2000, recognizing that "[a]doption practice has changed signifi-
cantly"407 since the publication of the previous standards, the League 
401. See generally Marianne Bower Blair, The Uniform Adoption Act's Health Dis· 
closure Provisions: A Model that Should Not Be Overlooked, 30 FAM. L.Q. 427, 455 
(1996). 
402. Rita Dukette, Perspectives for Agency Response to the Adoption·Record Contro· 
versy, 54 CHILD WELFARE 545,547 (1975). 
403. [d. at 553. 
404. MARy ANN JONES, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., THE SEALED ADOPTION 
RECORD CONTROVERSY: REPORT OF A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPIN-
IONS 21-23 (1976). 
405. CARP, supra note 5, at 175. 
406. [d. at 194. 
407. Child Welfare League of Am., CWLA Standards of Excellence for Adoption Ser-
vices, available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/adoption/cwla_standards.htm (last 
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advised agencies to promote policies that provide adopted adults with 
direct access to identifying information. 40B Twenty years earlier, an 
advisory panel of the Children's Bureau recommended a model state 
adoption act under which adult adoptees would have access to birth 
and court records. 409 After receiving negative comments on the act, 
including objections to the open records provisions from ninety per-
cent of commenting adoptive parents, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare promulgated a model act that dealt only with 
the adoption of children with special needs and did not include the 
open records provisions.4lO Perhaps social service workers and poli-
cymakers have supported greater openness than states have afforded 
because of those professionals' familiarity with emerging thinking in 
their fields as well as their direct involvement with adult adoptees, 
adoptive parents, and birth parents. 
State laws passed after the 1960s establishing passive and active 
registries of course reflect and reinforce the idea that the purpose of 
lifelong secrecy is to protect birth parents' right to anonymity and 
that therefore identifying information should not be available to 
adult adoptees without the consent of the birth parent whose identity 
will be revealed. In Connecticut, for example, two years after closing 
birth records to adult adoptees, the legislature created an elaborate 
system under which an adult adoptee could petition a court for iden-
tifying information, and receive such information after an agency in-
vestigation and report to the court, if the birth parents gave written 
consent and if the court did not determine that the release of the in-
formation would be "seriously disruptive" or endanger the health of 
the adoptee or birth parents. If the birth parents could not be found, 
a guardian ad litem was to be appointed who could consent on their 
behalf.411 The recent state laws that have prospectively established 
access to birth records412 also reflect the idea that, at least in adop-
tions completed before or during the period when birth records were 
closed to adoptees, there is a pre-existing right to lifelong anonymity 
that must be preserved. 
The fact that states have moved so cautiously toward opening 
birth records, notwithstanding revolutionary social change and the 
efforts of open records advocates, is likely due in part to the power 
and persistence of the social understanding about lifelong secrecy 
visited Feb. 15, 2001). 
408. [d. 
409. Model State Adoption Act and Model State Adoption Procedures: Recommen· 
dations of the Model Adoption Legislation and Procedures Advisory Panel, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 10,622, 10,686·89 (Feb. 15, 1980). 
410. CARP, supra note 5, at 187·88. 
411. 1977 Conn. Pub. Acts 77·246. 
412. See supra note 25. 
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and its affiliated meanings. The three states that in very recent years 
have re-established unrestricted access to birth records-Tennessee, 
Oregon, and Alabama413-have responded to open record advocates' 
arguments that states' passive and active registries are ineffective, 
demean adult adoptees, and do not remedy the fundamental denial of 
adoptees' right to the kind of basic information about oneself that is 
available to all other persons. Reunion rates achieved through state 
and local passive registries are low, ranging, by one estimate, from a 
high of 4.4% to a median of 2.05%, with the lack of higher rates at-
tributed to factors such as being "under-funded [and] under-
staffed."414 Efforts in the United States Congress to establish a na-
tionwide passive registry have so far been unsuccessful.415 Beyond the 
criticism that these registries are ineffective, other objections include 
the view that both passive and active registries are psychologically 
unhelpful to the adult adoptee. The systems "abrogate one of the 
most fundamental principles of social work practice, self-
determination. Under such systems the locus of control, which the 
search serves to remedy, remains outside the adoptee, thereby keep-
ing her in a position of passivity and dependence."416 In addition, the 
"assumption that reunions mediated by adoption workers have better 
outcomes than reunions worked out solely by the adoptee and birth-
parent themselves" is criticized as "unsupportable."417 
Tennessee's and Oregon's open records laws have been chal-
lenged and upheld in cases in which opponents have argued that the 
measures violate federal and state constitutions. The Oregon law, 
passed as a ballot initiative in 1998, provides that adoptees age 
twenty-one and older may receive copies of their original birth cer-
tificates upon request.4lB Under the law, a birth parent may file a 
413. See supra note 23. 
414. Troxler, supra note 325. For example, in the first twelve years of Illinois's pas-
sive registry, there were reportedly only twenty-eight matches. Heidi Hildebrand, Be-
cause They Want to Know: An Examination of the Legal Rights of Adoptees and Their 
Parents, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 515, 515 n.3 (2000) (citing Adrienne Drell, Opening the 
Books on Adoption, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 6); see also Alan W. Strasser, 
Adoption Search and Registry Laws of Vermont and New York: Whose Best Interest Is 
Being Served?, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 669, 708-09 (1994) (discussing the changing so-
cietal attitudes toward biological mothers and the supporting laws that facilitate 
adoptees' searches for their biological families). 
415. See supra note 12. 
416. Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 88. 
417. Id. The authors recommend that adoptees have personal access to the "infor-
mation within the context of an encounter with an adopteeadvocate rather than in the 
context of 'counseling.'" Id. 
418. See Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 825 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 6 P.3d 
1098 (Or. 2000), stay denied, 530 U.S. 1228 (2000). The Oregon House of Representa-
tives passed the bill to complement the enactment. H.B. 3194, 70th Leg. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 1999). 
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"Contact Preference Form" indicating whether. the birth parent 
would like to be contacted, would prefer to be contacted through an 
intermediary, or would prefer not to be contacted "at this time."419 
The Oregon courts held that under state and federal constitutions, 
the law neither unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contract 
nor invades a guaranteed privacy right.420 Oregon's adoption laws 
never "prevented all dissemination of information concerning the 
identities of birth mothers. At no time in Oregon's history have the 
adoption laws required the consent of, or even notice to, a birth 
mother on the opening of adoption records or sealed birth certifi-
cates."421 A birth mother does not have "a fundamental right to give 
birth to a child and then have someone else assume legal responsibil-
ity for that child .... Adoption necessarily involves a child that al-
ready has been born, and a birth is, and historically has been, essen-
tially a public event."422 By the time the Oregon litigation was con-
cluded in 2000, more than 2,000 requests for birth records had been 
filed. 423 
The Tennessee statute, passed in 1995, provides adoptees 
twenty-one years of age and older with a right of access to birth re-
cords, as well as to court and agency records.424 The law responds to 
concerns about birth parents' privacy with a "contact veto" mecha-
nism for adoptions that took place after the date on which adult 
adoptee access to birth records was prohibited. Birth parents and 
specified other relatives may register their willingness or unwilling-
ness to have contact with an adoptee who obtains his or her re-
cords.425 Contact initiated in violation of a veto is a misdemeanor and 
subjects the contacting party to a civil suit for injunctive relief and 
damages.426 Opponents of the Tennessee law argued unsuccessfully in 
federal court that the law violates constitutional rights of birth 
419. H.B. 3194, 70th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999). 
420. Does, 993 P.2d at 833-34. 
421. Id. at 832. The court also noted that not all birth certificates were sealed, and 
that whether a certificate would be sealed was up to the adoptive parents, the child, or 
the court, and not to the birth mother. Id. at 832-33. 
422. Id. at 836. 
423. See Editorial, Adoption Papers; Courts Consistently Rule in Favor of Open Re· 
cords, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 14,2000, at 10. 
424. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1991). 
425. Id. §§ 36-1-128 to -129. The contact veto is not available in connection with re-
cords existing prior to March 16, 1951, which were not sealed at the time they were 
created. Id. §§ 36-1-127 to -128. When an adoptee obtains records, he must identify 
persons or classes of persons who are eligible to refuse contact and with whom he 
wishes to establish contact. "The state then attempts to contact such persons, whether 
or not they have filed a contact veto, so that they may confirm, vary, or withdraw an 
already filed veto." If such persons cannot be located after diligent search, then there 
is no restriction against contact. Id. §§ 36-1-130 to -131. 
426. Id. § 36-1-132. 
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mothers to familial privacy, reproductive privacy, and the non-
disclosure of private information.427 In subsequent state court litiga-
tion, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in 1999, upheld the statute, de-
ciding under the state constitution that the law neither impaired 
birth mothers' vested rights nor violated their right to privacy.428 The 
court noted that early state law did not require sealing records, and 
that later law permitted disclosure upon "a judicial finding that dis-
closure was in the best interest of the adopted person and the public," 
with no requirement that birth parents be notified or have an oppor-
tunity to veto contact.429 The court found that "[t]here simply has 
never been an absolute guarantee or even a reasonable expectation 
by the birth parent" that records would never be opened.430 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, adoption law did not proceed in a simple, single step 
from a period in which court and birth records were closed to the 
public to a period in which the records were permanently closed to all 
of the parties. Instead, a more complete and accurate history of the 
law reveals interim periods, lengthy ones in many states, in which 
court records were closed to all, while birth records, as recommended 
by social service and legal authorities, were closed to everyone except 
the adult adoptees whose births they registered. Laws closing adop-
tion records to the parties were enacted not as a shield to protect 
birth parents from their adult children's ever learning their identity, 
but as a sword to prevent them from interfering with the adoptive 
families raising the children. This rationale was ubiquitous into the 
1960s, and it is only later that an additional rationale achieves wide-
spread currency: the rationale of protecting birth parents' lifelong 
privacy by prohibiting adult adoptees' access to birth records. 
The observation that "law is culture"431 is nowhere more apt than 
in this history of adoption law. The earliest laws prohibiting adult 
adoptees' access to birth records reflected not an instrumental goal of 
protecting birth parents from discovery by adult adoptees but instead 
427. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 706-08 (6th Cir. 1997). 
428. See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 1999). 
429. [d. at 925. 
430. [d. 
431. Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: A Cultural-Legal Analysis, N.Y.U. PUB. L. & 
LEGAL THEORY (1999), available at http://www.ssrn.com. The kind of analysis Profes-
sor Miller performed could provide another productive way to examine the history of 
birth records access. He examined how the legal and cultural meaning of circumcision 
has changed from the late nineteenth century through the present. He used a set of 
polarities around which our culture's concept of the good is organized: purity and pol-
lution, health and harm, self and others, natural and unnatural, beauty and deformity, 
gender-appropriate and gender-inappropriate, order and chaos, good and bad, and true 
and false. 
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a social understanding of adoption as a perfect and c,Omplete substi-
tute for creating a family by childbirth. As a widespread legal regime 
of partial secrecy developed-with court records sealed and birth re-
cords closed to all except adult adoptees-negative social meanings 
became attached to adult adoptee interest in birth families, and the 
understanding became firmly established that lifelong secrecy was 
an essential feature of adoptions in which the birth and adoptive 
parents did not know one another. The potency of this understanding 
was apparent from the 1960s onward, when it was increasingly 
threatened by radical social change. The understanding itself and the 
social meanings associated with it were increasingly discounted and 
were directly challenged by the individual actions and group advo-
cacy of adoptees and birth parents. At the same time, in defensive 
constructions of the understanding and meanings, adoptees' interest 
in birth families came to be seen as being in conflict with birth par-
ents' right to or guarantee of lifelong anonymity, and a substantial 
minority of states moved to extinguish adult adoptees' legal right to 
access birth records. 
It is no wonder that to many adoptees and birth parents the law 
has seemed painfully incongruent with experience. Those adoptees 
who have sought and been unable to obtain identifying information, 
either through a variety of private channels or through public regis-
tries, have felt acutely the stern social opprobrium of sealed birth re-
cords laws. Birth parents who have supported adoptees' opposition to 
closed records have felt, understandably in light of the history re-
counted here, that lifelong anonymity was a harsh consequence of 
their circumstances rather than a benevolently bestowed protection. 
The pain caused by having one's deepest feelings met with official 
censure is conveyed by open records advocates' quotation of a florid 
but fervent statement by a government authority. In an unpublished 
trial court decision reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
the judge wrote: 
The law must be constant with life. It cannot and should not ignore 
broad historical currents of history. Mankind is possessed of no 
greater urge than to try to understand the age-old questions: "Who 
am I?" "Why am I?" Even now the sands and ashes of the conti-
nents are being shifted where we made our first steps as man. Re-
ligions of mankind often include ancestor worship in one way or 
another. For many, the future is blind without a sight of the past. 
Those emotions and anxieties that generate our thirst to know the 
past are not superficial and whimsical. They are real and they are 
"good cause" under the law of man and God.432 
Although the movement of the states toward greater openness 
432. Bradey v. Children's Bureau, S.C. Ct. Com. PI., Apr. 9, 1979, quoted in Har-
rington, supra note 262, at 38. 
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has been slow and cautious, it has been nationwide and its pace has 
been accelerating sharply in recent years.433 The numerous passive 
and active registries are being supplemented or supplanted by the 
growing number of states opening all records, re-opening records not 
closed at their inception, opening records prospectively, or opening 
all or some records subject to disclosure vetoes by birth parents. 
These changes both reflect and foster the difficult process of decon-
structing lifelong secrecy. It may be expected that one day the num-
ber of states opening birth records will reach a critical "tipping 
point,"434 a point after which a majority of states will reject lifelong 
secrecy as expeditiously as they once embraced it. 
433. The trend toward more open birth records represented by the laws described 
and cited in this Article is not negated by a recent rash of "safe haven" or "Baby 
Moses" laws, designed to address the small number of cases nationwide in which new-
born babies are abandoned and often die as a result. These laws typically provide for a 
parent of a newborn to leave the child anonymously at designated locations. AB of the 
fall of 2000, fourteen states had passed such laws and approximately twelve others 
had considered doing so. These laws have been criticized on the ground that the chil-
dren will never be able to learn the identity of their parents or information about their 
medical histories. See Michael S. Raum & Jeffrey L. Skaare, Encouraging Abandon-
ment: The Trend Towards Allowing Parents to Drop Off Unwanted Newborns, 76 N.D. 
L. REV. 511 (2000); Jacqueline L. Salmon, For Unwanted Babies, a Safety Net; More 
States Offer "Havens" to Deter Abandonment, but Critics Abound, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 
2000, atAl. 
434. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE 
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000) (analyzing the spread of social phenomena from a mathe-
matical perspective). 
